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ABSTRACT 
 
The papers included in this thesis deal with a few aspects of insurance economics that have 
seldom been dealt with in the applied literature.  
In the first paper “What causes insurance fraud? Evidence on Motor Third Party Liability in Italian 
Provinces” I apply for the first time the tools of the applied economics of crime to study the 
determinants of frauds, using data on Italian provinces. I find a negative correlation between frauds 
and economic development. The contributions to the literature are manifold: 
- I show that the price of insuring has a positive correlation with the propensity to defraud 
- Social norms constraint fraudulent behavior, but their strength is severely curtailed in 
economic downturns 
- On the methodological side, I apply a simple extension of the Random Coefficient model, 
which allows for the presence of time invariant covariates and asymmetries in the impact of 
the regressors.  
The second paper, “The Value and Price of a “Too-Big-to-Fail-Guarantee in  the Insurance 
Industry”, assesses how and to what extent the evolution of macro prudential regulation of 
insurance companies has been reflected in their equity prices. To this end I employ a standard 
event study methodology, deriving the definition of the “control” and “treatment” groups from what 
is implied by the regulatory framework. The main results are: 
- Markets care about the evolution of the legislation, and their perception has shifted from a 
first positive assessment of a possible implicit “too big to fail” subsidy to a more negative 
one related to its price in terms of stricter capital requirement 
- The size of this phenomenon is positively related to leverage, size and on the geographical 
location of the insurance companies    
The third paper, “Business Cycle and Motor Insurance Profitability” introduces a novel 
methodology to forecast non-life insurance premium growth and profitability as function of 
macroeconomic variables. It adapts the simultaneous equation framework traditionally used for 
macroeconometric models to some items of the technical account of the Italian motor third party 
business, employing a simple theoretical model of insurance pricing to derive a long term 
relationship between premiums, claims expenses and short term rates. The model is shown to 
provide a better forecast of premiums and profitability compared with the single equation 
specifications commonly used in applied analysis. 
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Gli articoli inclusi in queste tesi si occupano di aspetti dell'economia dell’assicurazione raramente 
trattati dalla letteratura empirica.  
Nel primo articolo , “What causes insurance fraud? Evidence on Motor Third Party Liability in 
Italian Provinces” si applicano per la prima volta gli strumenti dell'economia applicata del crimine 
per studiare le determinanti delle frodi assicurative, utilizzando dati sulle province italiane. SI trova 
una correlazione negativa tra frodi e sviluppo economico. I contributi alla letteratura sono 
molteplici: 
- Si mostra come il costo di assicurarsi ha una correlazione positiva con la propensione a 
frodare. 
- Il Comportamento fraudolento è limitato dalle norme sociali, ma la loro forza è indebolita 
severamente in caso di recessione. 
- Dal punto di vista metodologico, si applica una semplice estensione del modello Random 
Coefficient, che permette di impiegare regressori fissi nel tempo e di tenere conto 
dell’impatto asimmetrico delle variabili esplicative.  
Il secondo articolo, “The Value and Price of a “Too-Big-to-Fail-Guarantee: Evidence from the 
Insurance Industry” valuta come e in che misura l'evoluzione della regolamentazione 
macroprudenziale delle compagnie di assicurazione si è riflessa nel prezzo delle loro azioni. A tal 
fine si utilizza una metodologia event study, derivando la definizione dei gruppi di "controllo" e 
"trattamento" dalle implicazioni dal quadro normativo. I principali risultati sono: 
- Il mercato finanziario reagisce all’evoluzione della legislazione, e la sua percezione è 
cambiata da una prima valutazione positiva di un possibile sussidio implicito  a una più 
negativa, a causa del suo costo in termini di requisiti patrimoniali più severi 
- L’intensità del fenomeno è maggiore per le compagnie con più indebitate, più grandi, e 
dipende dalla loro localizzazione geografica. 
Il terzo articolo, “Business Cycle and Motor Insurance Profitability: Evidence for Italy” presenta una 
nuova metodologia per prevedere la crescita dei premi di assicurazione danni la profittabilità del 
settore in funzione di variabili macroeconomiche .Lo schema ad equazioni simultanee 
tradizionalmente usato per i modelli macroeconometrici  viene adattato ad alcune voci del conto 
economico del settore auto italiano, impiegando un semplice modello teorico di pricing 
dell’assicurazione danni per derivare una relazione di equilibrio tra premi, costi dei sinistri premi e 
tassi a breve termine. Si mostra come il modello fornisce dei premi che della profittabilità previsioni 
più accurate rispetto alle specificazioni a equazione singola utilizzate nelle letteratura applicata.  
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This paper seeks to explain the large differences in the incidence of 
motor insurance fraud between Italian provinces. The econometric 
analysis highlights the role of the variability in per capita income and 
strength of social norms common to other types of crimes. Moreover 
the differences in the average cost of purchasing this mandatory 
cover are shown to affect the propensity to defraud. Finally, cyclical 
fluctuations in the labor market have an effect, both directly and by 
weakening the deterrent power of social norms.  
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
In this article I apply the tools of the economic analysis of crime to a very specific form of offense: 
fraud in motor third part liability (MTPL) insurance, a compulsory cover for all drivers in most 
countries. The empirical analysis of crime has normally focused on property crimes in which there 
are normally no prior relationships between the perpetrators and the victim. In the case of 
insurance fraud, a contractual relationship exists (in the case of MTPL insurance, a very specific 
and standardized one), and the terms of the contract may play some role in the propensity to 
breach it. The first contribution of this paper is then the analysis of the impact of the contract terms 
(more specifically, the cost of the insurance policy) on the propensity to cheat. The second one is 
the assessment of the impact of the business cycle on the propensity to defraud, not just directly 
but also via the effect on the strength of the social norms that should act as deterrent. I focus on 
Italy because of its large diversity in social and economic conditions and the extreme variability of 
insurance prices. The econometric analysis uses aggregate data on provinces but employs a panel 
specification that can disentangle the effects of cross-unit variability from those due to cyclical 
fluctuations. The empirical analysis of insurance fraud is not a new field, but this is, to my 
knowledge, the first time the tools on the economics of crime are applied to aggregate data and 
consider explicitly the insurance contract terms.  
The main results can be summarized as follows: first of all, the terms of the insurance contract, 
approximated by the average price paid by motorists, matter in explaining the incidence of fraud. 
Average premium has a strong explanatory power, especially when it is instrumented using 
determinants of insurance pricing not related to frauds; this highlights the role of perceived fairness 
of a financial contract and the level of trust in the financial institutions issuing it. Secondly, social 
norms play a deterrent role, but their strength is significantly lessened when economic conditions 
worsen, in particular after the 2008/09 recession. Additionally, and in line with evidence on the 
determinants of crime rates, the economic environment matters, both in terms of "structural" 
differences in per capita income across provinces and of cyclical changes in the unemployment 
rate.  
The results are relevant first of all for the insurance industry and the regulators: a reduction in the 
overall level of costs and possibly, in its variability across provinces may be helpful in combating 
frauds, which are responsible for a non-negligible part of compensation costs which, in turn, are to 
a large extent passed onto policyholders. Moreover the estimates of the impact of the business 
cycle on frauds can be useful for insurance company to predict the evolution of the incidence of 
fraud. However, some of the implications of the results go beyond insurance. Firstly, it documents 
empirically that the terms of a financial contract may provide an incentive to breach it. Secondly, it 
shows that the impact of social norms on criminal activity is not time invariant, but it is affected by 
the business cycle.  
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 defines insurance fraud, in Section 3 I sketch the 
model that serves as background for the empirical analysis and describe the possible role of the 
perceived fairness of the insurance price and of social interactions. Section 4 has a quick review of 
the economic literature and the following one describes the data on frauds, as a preliminary to the 
econometric analysis, shown in Section 6. The results are presented in section 7 and their 
robustness to spatial correlation and different measures of the strength of social norms are shown 
in section 8. Section 9 concludes.  
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2. DEFINING INSURANCE FRAUD  
 
Insurance fraud is a form of ex-post moral hazard that involves the manipulation of information in 
order to unduly benefit from insurance protection: it can entail either the making up of a non-
existing claim or the exaggeration of the damages sustained in a true accident. Fraudsters take 
advantage of the promise made by the insurer to pay losses in some circumstances defined when 
signing the contract. This kind of crime, therefore, occurs within the context of a contractual 
relationship linking the insurer and the policyholder. As a consequence, the decision to invent or 
exaggerate an accident can be seen as an (extreme) economic response to the terms of the 
contract; the potential importance of the contract characteristics sets frauds apart from other forms 
of consumer dishonesty, such as shoplifting.  
Insurance fraud has been characterized as a "crime without victims". Due to mutualization, the 
extra costs due to fraud, if not detected and recovered, are passed to a large extent onto all 
policyholders. This does not create any significant of harm to any of them individually, possibly 
leading to policyholders' underestimation of the severity of the offense. Moreover, if the concept of 
risk-pooling is poorly understood, people may be led to think that fraudsters steal the insurers' 
money and non that belonging to policyholders. This may lead to a high tolerance to fraud and a 
consequent reduction of the moral costs attached to committing it, especially in areas where 
premiums are high (not necessarily due to frauds) or in response to a large increase in premiums.  
The analysis in this paper deals with fraud in Motor Third Part Liability Insurance (Responsabilità 
Civile Auto e Natanti, in Italian), a mandatory cover against damages caused to other vehicles and 
persons while driving. In this line of business insurers have the obligation to provide a binding 
quote to any driver who asks for it, regardless of her driving history. Ratemaking must adhere to 
several regulatory requirements on, for example, deductibles and level and modes of 
compensation. Moreover compensations for bodily injuries (which account for nearly 70% of total 
paid to claim-holders) are to a large extent dictated by the law and are often decided after a trial. 
As a consequence, in this line of business insurers cannot adopt many of the contract features 
designed to prevent frauds like pricing out unwanted customers or setting a high a level for 
deductible; therefore, the costs related to being caught are one of the few leverages that can be 
used to reduce the extent of fraud.  
3. DRIVERS OF FRAUD: ECONOMIC CONDITIONS, CONTRACT TERMS AND SOCIAL 
CAPITAL  
 
My analysis follows the standard framework for the economic analysis of crime dating back to the 
seminal works of Becker (1968), Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and Ehrlich (1973). The decision 
to file a fraudulent claim is considered as the outcome of a rational choice based on the 
comparison of the utility gains of a successful attempt with the cost the fraudsters may incur if 
fraud is detected. As shown by a large body of empirical literature, the business cycle and in 
particular its impact on the unemployment rate are key drivers of this trade off1
                                               
1 See, for example Raphael and Winter-Ebmer (2001), and Gould et al., 2002.  
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I extend the analysis in two directions and focus on:  
• The impact on the price of the insurance contract and its perceived "fairness" on the 
propensity to defraud  
• The strength of social norms, and in particular whether it is correlated with the business 
cycle  
3.1 CONTRACT TERMS  
 
I consider claim falsifications related to a well identified and highly standardized insurance 
contract2, for which I have aggregate price information at the provincial level that can be used to 
build a direct link with the measure of fraud. On average, in Italy every year only around 6% of 
vehicles undergo an accident covered by MTPL policies; therefore it is fair to say that the price 
each policyholder pay is the only feature that matters to the large majority of them as very few are 
exposed to other characteristics of the contract (the speed of response, quality of the reparation, 
etc.). MTPL insurance in Italy is one of the most expensive in Europe3 and the differences across 
provinces are very large indeed, as shown by table 1, which shows the annual premium paid by 
three types of drivers, as published by IVASS, the industry regulator.  
Table 1: Average premium by types of male driver in 2012, euros 
 1 2 3 
Aosta 1746 336 431 
L’Aquila 2397 473 607 
Milan 2601 505 649 
Bologna 3174 650 835 
Rome 3187 677 869 
Bari 3407 792 1025 
Naples 3734 1221 1580 
Source: IVASS 
1) 18 year old, top Bonus Malus (BM) class, with a 1300cc gasoline car 
2) 40 year old, lowest BM class, with a 1300cc gasoline car 
3) 55 year old, lowest BM class, with a 1900cc diesel car 
 
One of the hypotheses I want to test is whether this large differences in prices maps into the 
incidence of fraud. There can be several reasons for that: policyholders living in a province with a 
higher claims frequency can think that the price they pay for this mandatory cover is too high even 
though it is fairly priced from an actuarial point of view, moreover the perceived "unfairness" of the 
price paid for a mandatory cover can be enhanced by a poor understanding of the workings of non-
life insurance. Van Wolferen (2014) uses experiments to show that people think about non-life 
insurance as a financial investment (as suggested by Kunreuther et al. (2013)); when they do not 
incur in an accident, and therefore receive no compensation, policyholders might feel that the 
money spent for the premium is wasted, increasing their tolerance to fraud4.Changing company is 
                                               
2
 When subscribing an MTPL contract, the driver can choose between only two or three options regarding 
the limit to coverage (the minimum of which is set by law) and the deductible 
3
 Differences with respect to other European countries are due to a much higher claims frequency and a 
higher level of compensation. Similarly differences across provinces mirror a large variation if frequency and 
in the incidence of accidents with bodily injuries, see, for example ANIA (various issues) 
4
Insurance fraud may also be seen also as an example of "negative reciprocity". A growing strand of 
theoretical and experimental literature, surveyed in Fehr and Gachter and Fehr (2000) and Schmidt (2006) 
shows that consideration and expectation on how other agents behave are important drivers of individual 
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not yet a very popular option. According to the regulator, in 2014 only 15,2% of policyholder 
switched to another insurer, despite the substantial savings that can be achieved: those who 
changed companies saw their premium decrease by almost 22% as opposed to the 5% 
experienced by those who did not move(see IVASS, 2015). This may be due to poor information, 
which may lead motorists to see the cost for this mandatory cover as a tax rather than the price of 
a financial product and possible react accordingly, by defrauding or fail to insure5 .  
3.2 SOCIAL CAPITAL  
 
According to IVASS, on average only slightly more than 2% of the accidents believed by the 
insurers to be fraudulent are actually reported to the judiciary (IVASS, 2013). Therefore, the 
probability of undergoing a trial if caught defrauding is extremely low. Insurers are forbidden by law 
to refuse to insure a driver who accepts the quote proposed, and efforts to price away riskier 
drivers by charging very high premiums are often punished by the regulator. Given the relatively 
overall low incidence of fraud, some other kind of punishment may be at work as deterrent. One 
particular candidate is the existence of civic norms: these will increase the (non-pecuniary) 
opportunity cost of defrauding, given the guilt and shame it would provoke. The strength of informal 
networks, arising for example in small communities may magnify this effect by means of social 
sanctions such as ostracism for those known as an insurance fraudsters. Starting from the seminal 
work of Putnam (1993) the impact of civic norms and associations (grouped together under the 
somehow loose heading of "social capital") on various aspects of social life has been studied at 
large. Italy has been the subject of quite a lot of analyses, due to the wide and persistent 
differences in indicators of social capital across provinces. Guiso et al. (2004), based on a large 
household survey, find that various measures of social capital show a strong correlation with 
individual financial choices. In areas with higher social capital people tend to rely more on banks 
for financial transactions, holding less cash and being involved in less informal lending, and invest 
in more sophisticated financial products. Working with aggregate data at the provincial level Millo 
and Pasini (2010) show that social capital increases the demand for non-life insurance. The 
relationship between social capital, the strength of networks and various forms of criminal activity 
in Italy has been studied by Buonanno et al. (2009) and Buonanno et al. (2012), using data at the 
province level. They find that civic norms (proxied by blood donation, electoral turnover and 
participation to charitable associations) and networks affect negatively property crimes; moreover, 
crime is lower when social interactions are denser, e.g. when a large share of population lives in 
small towns6. 
Most of the empirical analysis on the nexus between social capital and financial transactions is 
either based on cross-section regressions or include social capital as a time-invariant explanatory 
variable. However, it may well be that, when faced with extremely large adverse shocks (i.e. a 
                                                                                                                                                            
behavior Agents often deviate from purely self-interested behavior in a reciprocal manner: in response to 
friendly actions or expected intentions, people are much nicer and cooperative than predicted by the self-
interest model(positive reciprocity); conversely, after a hostile actions/intentions they are frequently much 
more nasty (negative reciprocity). The evidence indicates that these attitudes are important for bilateral 
negotia-tions, for the enforcement of social norms, for understanding the functioning of markets and 
economic incentives. More recently Kline et al. (2014) provide evidence from experiments and the World 
Value Survey that deviations from meritocracy are related to a higher propensity towards self-serving 
dishonesty. 
5
 According to ANIA, in 2014 8.7% of vehicles in use did not carry a valid insurance, with a peak of over 13% 
in the Southern regions 
6
 More specifically, they use as regressors he share of people living in center with less of 2000 inhabitants or 
in towns with more than 250,000. 
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surge in the unemployment rate), individuals may find social norms less binding and therefore, 
committing small offenses like insurance fraud more acceptable; I seek to assess whether and to 
what extent the large drop in economic activity and employment in 2008 and 2009 affected the 
deterrent impact on social capital on the propensity to defraud7. 
4 LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
Most of the theoretical literature on insurance fraud8 aims at either finding the contract, expressed 
in terms of premium, compensation and deductible which minimizes the incentive to defraud or to 
derive the optimal level of (costly) monitoring by the insurer, ignoring what drives the decision to 
defraud.  
On the empirical side, a rapidly increasing stream of literature utilizes individual claims data and 
run GLM models using as covariates the features of the policy (deductible, kasko, etc...), the 
details of the policyholder (age, sex, number of years with the same insurer, etc.) and information 
on the accident (period of the day, type of road, witnesses), to construct models able to flag 
suspicious claims9.  
However, the impact of the environmental variables and the business cycle, which this paper is 
focused on, is not considered in detail: the geographic location of the accidents is normally 
dummied out and the use of cross section data by construction neglects the impact of the business 
cycle. One exception is the paper by Dionne and Wang (2013) on Taiwan: they add to a standard 
probit model time dummies and find a statistically significant positive relationship between the 
probability of a claim being fraudulent and cyclical downturns.  
A very few papers use aggregate data for US states. Cummins and Tennyson (1996) use a cross 
section of data for 29 US states: lacking data on the incidence of frauds, they proxy ex-post moral 
hazard in motor insurance by the ratio of bodily injury claims in the total. They find a positive and 
significant correlation with a tolerant attitude to insurance fraud in the state, measured by a survey, 
the percentage of people without health insurance and with the urbanization rate. They find similar 
results for the share of sprain and strain claims (one of the easiest to fake injuries) over bodily 
injury claims. Tennyson (1997) provides an in-depth analysis of the survey data mentioned above. 
It turns out that over 20% of respondents find fraud at least "probably" acceptable. Overall 
individual attitude to fraud has a strong correlation with that expressed by people living in the same 
state, hinting at some environmental factors like to ones I review in this paper playing a role. 
Moreover, a negative attitude towards the insurance industry in general has a positive correlation 
with the attitude to fraud. Finally, Goel (2014) uses a cross-section of 31 US states and finds that 
insurance frauds convictions are inversely related to convictions for corruption and to higher public 
expenditure on crime fighting, while state level insurance regulation is generally not significant. He 
interprets the results as better institutions having a negative impact on the propensity to defraud 
and of substitution in enforcement resources. Moreover, fraud convictions are inversely correlated 
with per capita income and positively to the urbanization rate.  
                                               
7
 Stevenson and Wolfers (2011) find that, during the Great Recession, countries that experienced the largest 
rise in unemployment also show the largest drop in public confidence and trust towards national government 
and the financial sector. 
8
 A comprehensive and up-to-date survey can be found in Picard (2014). 
9
 See, for example the analysis on Spanish motor insurance carried out by Artìs, Ayuso and Guillém (2002) 
and Caudill, Ayuso and Guillém (2005). 
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5. THE DATA  
 
This article uses data on the number of MTPL claims reported as fraudulent by the insurance 
companies for each Italian province, and communicated to the regulator for statistical purposes: 
data are annual and range from 2000 and 2011, the last year for which they have been published. 
It is not possible to distinguish the percentage of frauds involving bodily injuries. Reported frauds 
may or may not have become part of a trial (most of them were not). In this way they are immune 
from the underreporting bias which affects other data on crime.  
However, there is not a common methodology, agreed by all the insurance companies or imposed 
by the regulator, to assess whether a claim is truthful or false. Normally, each claim is 
automatically analyzed via an algorithm, and given a score. Suspect claims are then reported to 
local units for more in-depth searches based on standard criteria. However, these criteria may vary 
across companies (but not across provinces) and this may lead to some potential bias in the data 
as market shares of companies are not homogeneous across provinces. The econometric 
methodology used in this paper seeks to minimize this potential bias. 
Figure 1: MTPL: Fraudulent claims ad % of the total 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 shows the share of fraudulent claims on the total by province, between 2000 and 2011. In 
most of the provinces frauds account for less than 5% of total accidents, but there are a few 
outliers showing an incidence in excess of 10%, with a marked downward trend.  
A further evidence of the polarization of the phenomenon is provided by the decomposition of the 
variance, shown in table 2. Most of the variability is across provinces; nevertheless the standard 
deviation across time is non-negligible, being equal to roughly one third of the mean.  
Table 2: Incidence of fraud in MTPL insurance: variance decomposition 
 Mean Std. Dev.  
Overall 2.139 2.769 
Between  2.680 
Within  0.742 
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As shown by Figure 2, the highest incidence of fraud is concentrated into a few neighboring 
provinces in the South and Sicily.  
Figure 2: MTPL: Geographic distribution of fraud incidence (2000-2011 average) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. THE ECONOMETRIC MODEL  
The econometric analysis aims at quantifying how the incidence of insurance fraud, measured as 
(the log of) the number of fraudulent claims per 100,000 people is affected by:  
• The economic environment: I will consider both the differences across provinces in per capita 
GDP and unemployment rate and their deviations from the long term province mean, to assess 
whether fraudulent activity is related to structural differences in income and the extent to which it 
reflects business cycle fluctuations10 .  
• Social capital and networks: I test whether non-pecuniary costs of committing frauds, which have 
been shown to be significant in explaining property crime, matter for insurance fraud as well. I 
employ standard measures of social capital and network strength. In the baseline specification a 
time-invariant effect is assumed and subsequently I shall assess whether the strength of civic 
                                               
10
 As far as the unemployment rate is concerned, the focus on a very specific type of crime and the use of 
data at the provincial level should minimize the aggregation bias in the relationship between unemployment 
and crime first illustrated by Chiricos (1987). 
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norms has been affected by busyness cycle fluctuations and, in particular by the severe downturn 
that the economy experienced in 2008 and 2009.  
• The price of insurance: In order to test whether a higher cost of insuring increases the propensity 
to defraud I use as a regressor the average MTPL premium in the provinces, lagged one year, as 
the price paid on the last policy renewal is the only piece of information on the contract available 
when deciding to commit a fraud (MTPL contracts are annual). The possible endogeneity of the 
variable is dealt with by using Instrumental Variables.  
In addition to these variables I use a list of proxies for factors which may facilitate fraudulent 
activity, such as the relative (in)efficiency of the judiciary, the presence of organized crime, and 
road congestion. Additionally, based on the evidence on individual claims, I add a proxy for the 
average age of vehicles, i.e. the share of vehicles older than four years in the total stock. Table 3 
summarizes the explanatory variables and shows whether they are time invariant or not.  
Table 3: Explanatory variables 
 Time Invariant ? 
Economic conditions  
Per capita GDP No 
Unemployment Rate No 
Socio-demographic factors  
Adult population by age class No 
Crime and judicial system  
Days for a 1st degree sentence Yes 
Index of organized crime Yes 
Social capital and networks  
Blood donations per 1000 adults Yes 
% living in small towns Yes 
% living in large cities Yes 
Tolerance to fraud  
Average MTPL premium Yes 
Vehicle parc  
% of new vehicles No 
Vehicle per square mq No 
 
The nature of these variables raises a series of issues:  
1. It is not possible to rule completely out that the criteria to identify a fraudulent are homogeneous 
across provinces; this would call for a Fixed Effect estimator...  
2. ..however, some of the explanatory variables are time invariant, requiring a Random Effect 
estimator.  
3. Average premiums are likely to be endogenous; in terms of compensation paid or reserved, 
fraudulent claims account for around 2% of the total, but in some provinces they make for nearly 
15% of the total. The correlation between fraud incidence measured on the number of claims and 
on the sums paid is 97%, hinting at frauds playing a non-negligible role in the costs borne by 
insurers and reflected in premiums in some areas where the phenomenon is more widespread. 
Moreover, average premiums are calculated by dividing the premium amount by the stock of 
registered vehicles. This may be badly measured, as sometimes vehicles no longer in circulation 
are not canceled and during the period considered there was not any direct linkage between the 
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databases containing the lists of the insured and registered vehicles: the potential measurement 
error of the variable strengthen the case for instrumental variables  
4. There could be spatial correlation in the dependent variable, possible due to social and cultural 
factors not fully captured by the regressors or, more trivially, by the fact that fraudsters can operate 
also in other (possibly neighboring) provinces.  
The first three issues are dealt with in the baseline estimation, while the fourth is considered as a 
robustness test.  
6.1 DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA  
 
Table 4 and 5 show the summary statistics and the correlation between the variables on which I 
focus my analysis on. There appears to be a large (cross sectional) variability between them; the 
correlation between frauds and the most important explanatory variables, with the notable 
exception of average premiums, are in line with what hypothesized in Section 4.  
Table 4: Summary statistics 
 Mean Std. Dev  Min Max 
Frauds 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.018 
P.C. GDP (euro '000) 18.292 4.880 8.921 33.503 
Unempl. Rate 8.380 5.768 1.340 32.440 
Org. Crime 2.065 1.490 0.383 8.500 
Jud. Efficiency 2.848 0.829 1.425 5.882 
Blood donations 0.383 0.146 0.120 0.850 
% in small towns 9.703 9.687 0.000 42.559 
% in large cities 5.154 14.491 0.000 69.505 
Avg. Premium (euro '000) 0.367 0.059 0.169 0.656 
 
6.2 MODEL SPECIFICATION  
 
In order to employ simultaneously time varying and invariant regressors I use a version of the RE 
specification originally proposed by Mundlak (1978), the Within-Between model illustrated in detail 
by Bell and Jones (2015). Consider a standard RE specification:   
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑧𝑖 + (𝑢𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡)     (1) 
It requires that covariates be independent of residuals.      
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑥𝑖𝑡 , 𝑢𝑖) = 0, 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑥𝑖𝑡 , 𝑒𝑖𝑡) = 0         (2) 
This assumption is seldom met by data, leading researchers to discard Random Effects in favor of 
the Fixed Effects specification in which time invariant covariates are averaged out. This 
endogeneity often arises from the fact that time varying covariates are treated as single process, 
whereas in fact they can be decomposed in a "between" component, which does not vary with 
time, and a "within" one  
                 𝑥𝑖𝑡 = 𝑥𝑖
𝐵 + 𝑥𝑖𝑡
𝑊                    (3) 
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Table 5: Cross-correlation table 
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𝑥𝑖
𝐵 =
1
𝑇
∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=0
 
𝑥𝑖𝑡
𝑊 = 𝑥𝑖𝑡 − 𝑥𝑖
𝐵 
The specification in (1) assumes that within and between effects are equal; the variance that is not 
accounted for will end up in the error term, leading them to be correlated with the regressor.  
The proposed alternative uses both components of the time-varying regressors, in order to account 
for both the impact of the difference across units and of the cyclical fluctuation around the mean  
𝑥𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝑥𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖) + 𝛽2?̅?𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑧𝑖 + (𝑢𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡)  (4) 
?̅?𝑖 =
1
𝑇
∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=0
 
The response of fraud to the business cycle or to change in the insurance cost need not be 
symmetric. Mocan, Billups and Overland (2005) develop a model in which, if an individual commits 
a crime during a cyclical downturn, her legal human capital decreases due to for, example bad 
reputation, whereas the criminal one appreciates, and this may make it difficult for her to switch 
back to a legitimate activity when the economy recovers; this leads to hysteresis, whereby the 
reduction in criminal activity during booms are smaller than its increase in downturns. Similarly, 
Calvo-Armengol, Verdier and Zenou (2007) show that, when a person engages in a criminal 
activity when his peers commit crimes too, she finds it difficult to go back to the labor market. 
Mocan and Bali (2010) test this proposition using aggregate data on US states and individual data 
for all those born in Philadelphia in 1958. They find that year-on-year increase in the 
unemployment rate have a large, in absolute value, impact on the diffusion of several types of 
crime than an improvement in the labor market. I extend the Within-Between specification including 
in the model both positive and negative deviations of per capita GDP and unemployment from their 
long term mean, to see whether the business cycle has an asymmetric impact on the propensity to 
defraud.  
The specification has then two endogenous regressors, the province mean of the average 
premiums and the deviations from it. I assume that premiums are set in using backward looking 
expectations and use the lagged values11 of a few determinants of claims frequency and severity 
impacting compensation costs, and therefore premiums, without affecting the propensity to 
defraud, namely:  
• The incidence of fatal accidents: compensations for deaths are extremely costly and fatal 
accidents are very unlikely to have been made up  
• The average rainfall in the province, affecting both the frequency and sever-ity of true accidents. 
Note that the dependent variable used in the ratio of fraudulent claims on population. Had I used 
the ratio on total claims this instrument would not have been valid.  
• Fuel consumption per vehicle, a proxy for the intensity of vehicles' use, and therefore of the 
likelihood of an accident; in principle this should affect just true accidents, as the decision of 
commit a fraud does not depend on how intensive is car usage.  
                                               
11
 at (t-2), then 
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• The share of national highways in the total, excluding motorways12. Accidents in non-urban road 
have four times the number of fatalities than those occurring elsewhere. Fraudsters choose where 
to stage a fake accident, so the percentage of non-urban road is most likely to matter just for true 
claims.  
I use two lags of the first three variables to account for smooth adjustment of premiums to changes 
in compensation costs13. In order to test the validity of the instruments I employ four tests:  
• A standard F test for the significance of the excluded instruments in the two first-stage regression  
• The Kleibergen-Paap (2006) for underidentification with potentially non i.i.d errors: it is a test of 
whether the excluded instruments are cor-related with the endogenous regressors  
• The Angrist-Pischke (AP) first-stage F tests of weak identification of the individual endogenous 
regressor, i.e. to check whether the excluded in-struments are only weakly correlated with the 
endogenous regressors, see Angrist and Pischke (2009), pp. 217-18.  
• The standard J-test for overidentification  
7 RESULTS  
7.1 BASELINE SPECIFICATION  
 
In Table 6 I show the result of the baseline specification: the first column has just the economic 
determinants, then the measures of organized crime, court efficiency, social capital and networks 
are added, and finally the full model including premiums is estimated by GLS and by 2SGLS.  
Frauds are more widespread in poorer provinces, in those where social cap-ital is lower and where 
people are more concentrated in large cities; this is consistent with the evidence on other types of 
crime. Moreover, fluctuations in the unemployment rate affect the propensity to defraud 
asymmetrically, in accordance with the hysteresis hypothesis. Finally, cross sectional differences in 
the long-term mean of the average premiums are positively correlated with frauds, but increases in 
premiums over time do not lead to a higher incidence of fraud.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
12
 Motorways accidents occurring in a given province are not very likely to involve only vehicles registered in 
that province 
13
 The most widely used time series model used to measure premium fluctuations in non-life insurance 
premiums, initially proposed by Lamm-Tennant and Weiss (1997) regress the percentage change in 
premiums on two own lags and at least the first and second lag of the ratio between compensation paid and 
premiums 
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Table 6: Estimation results: baseline specification 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
   Full Model Full Model-IV 
GDP above mean -0.202 -0.176 -0.320 -0.504 
 (0.581) (0.584) (0.525) (0.462) 
     
GDP below mean 0.292 0.274 0.452 0.642 
 (0.682) (0.681) (0.645) (0.591) 
     
GDP,  mean -0.206 -0.912 -1.646
***
 -2.666
***
 
 (0.633) (0.556) (0.508) (0.736) 
     
Unemp. rate above mean 0.0479
***
 0.0485
***
 0.0595
***
 0.0743
***
 
 (0.0178) (0.0180) (0.0188) (0.0270) 
     
Unemp. rate below mean -0.0193 -0.0199 -0.0178 -0.0156 
 (0.0129) (0.0128) (0.0129) (0.0121) 
     
Unemp. rate,  mean 0.0858
***
 0.0335 0.0232 0.00789 
 (0.0294) (0.0338) (0.0304) (0.0245) 
     
Organized crime  -0.0574 -0.0255 0.0190 
  (0.0356) (0.0331) (0.0400) 
     
Days(/365) for a 1st degree sentence  0.0737 0.0796 0.0873 
  (0.0777) (0.0592) (0.0557) 
     
Blood donations per 10,000 inhabitants  -0.880
**
 -0.913
**
 -0.965
***
 
  (0.412) (0.419) (0.324) 
     
 living in small villages  -0.0196
***
 -0.0111
*
 0.000221 
  (0.00674) (0.00626) (0.00849) 
     
 living in large cities  0.0127
***
 0.0115
***
 0.00978
***
 
  (0.00303) (0.00290) (0.00294) 
     
Deviation deom avg. premium   0.601
*
 1.329 
   (0.317) (1.141) 
     
Avg. premium, mean   2.171
***
 5.135
***
 
   (0.393) (1.768) 
Observations 824 824 824 824 
Standard errors in parentheses 
Dependent Variable: number of MTPL fraudulent claims per 10,0000inhabitants. Robust and province-clustered 
standard errors 
Additional Regressors, not shown: share of population aged 20 to 40 and over 65, vehicles per squared km, share of 
vehicles over 4 years old, macroregional dummies 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01 
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The results of the first stage regression are presented in table 7; the validity of the excluded 
instruments is confirmed.  
Table 7: 1st stage results 
  Deviation Mean 
Fatal acc. (-1)  0.005** -0.001 
  (0.000) (0.001) 
Fatal acc. (-2)  0.007*** 0.002* 
  (0.000) (0.001) 
Rainfall(-1) 0.013 0.008* 
  (0.014) (0.004) 
Rainfall(-2) 0.033*** -0.004 
  (0.008) (0.005) 
Fuel cons.(-1)  0.026* 0.009 
  (0.010) (0.006) 
Fuel cons.(-2)  0.01 0.014* 
  (0.013) (0.007) 
Share of Nat. routes -0.177 0.319*** 
  (0.123) (0.061) 
Std. Errors in brackets     
Tests on the instrumens 
F-test 4.13 3.79 
  (0.002) (0.003) 
AP F-test 21.57 17.80 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
KP underid. Test 20.68   
  (0.004)   
Hansen J 3.733   
  (0.202)   
 
7.2 SOCIAL CAPITAL OVER THE BUSINESS CYCLE  
 
In what follows I test whether changes in economic conditions, and especially the large contraction 
in GDP and employment occurred between the second half of 2008 and the end of 2009, affect the 
strength of social norms. I use two alternative methods. Firstly I augment the baseline model with 
the interaction of blood donation with time dummies having value 1 from 2008 or 2009 on or the 
positive and negative deviation of per capita GDP and the unemployment rate. The use of time 
dummies assumes implicitly that the impact of the crisis is the same for all provinces, whereas the 
interaction with the deviations allows for the fact that, due to the large differences across provinces 
in the structure of the employment, the crisis had initially a larger impact on the areas where the 
share of private sector employment, especially in the manufacturing sector, was higher. These 
areas broadly overlap with those featuring the highest levels of the proxies for social capital (see 
Cartocci, 2007). 
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Table 8: Estimation results: donations interacted 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
blood… -0.965*** -1.168*** -1.157*** -0.934*** -0.951*** 
 (0.324) (0.365) (0.358) (0.347) (0.324) 
      
…& post 2008 dummy  0.399***    
  (0.140)    
      
…& post 2009 dummy   0.517***   
   (0.181)   
      
…& GDP above mean    -3.826  
    (2.772)  
      
…& GDP below mean    -6.323*  
    (3.716)  
      
…& unemp. above mean     0.234*** 
     (0.0650) 
      
…& unemp. below mean     0.0814 
     (0.0635) 
N 824 824 824 824 824 
Dependent Variable: number of MTPL fraudulent claims per 10,0000 inhabitants. Robust and province-
clustered standard errors 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01 
 
Table 9 shows that the crisis, and especially the drop in employment reduced the deterrence 
provided by social capital. For example, looking at column (3), the elasticity with respect to blood 
donation is -1.168 before 2009 and becomes -1.17+0.399=-0.769, with a 35% fall, afterwards. By 
the same token, in Column (4), When per capita GDP is 5% below the (province) long-term 
average, the elasticity of social capital is -0.934 -6.323 x (-0.05) = -0.618; when the unemployment 
rate is 1 percentage point above the (province) long-term average, the elasticity of social capital is 
-0.959 + 0.240 x 1 = -0.719 (Column (5)).  
Alternatively, I estimate the baseline model splitting the sample in four nonoverlapping two-year 
periods; it appears that after the large drop in employment in 2008-9 social capital no longer 
exerted any influence on the propensity to defraud. 
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Table 9: Estimation results: sub periods 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 2004-2005 2006-2007 2008-2009 2010-2011 
GDP,  mean -1.442
*
 -2.037
***
 -0.908 -1.581
**
 
 (0.833) (0.744) (0.971) (0.774) 
     
Blood donations  -1.016
**
 -1.312
***
 -0.426 -0.283 
 (0.459) (0.426) (0.583) (0.400) 
Observations 206 206 206 206 
Dependent Variable: number of MTPL fraudulent claims per 10,0000inhabitants. Robust and 
province-clustered standard errors 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01 
 
8 ROBUSTNESS TESTS  
8.1 SPATIAL CORRELATION  
 
The inclusion of social capital is meant to capture some cultural factors that may explain why the 
highest incidence of insurance frauds is concentrated in a few neighboring provinces. However, the 
measures of social capital are imper-fect and may miss some other cultural traits specific to some 
areas. Moreover, ignoring spatial correlation in the variable may bias the estimates or make them 
inconsistent14. In order to test whether the results of the baseline model are robust to spatial 
effects, I reestimate the model adding a spatial lag. I use two different weighting matrices: a 
contiguity matrix and one with the inverse of the distance between each province's capital. The 
spatial leg is instrumented, as it is customary, with the weighted average of the explanatory 
variables, using each matrix in turn. Table 10 compares the baseline model with the two spatial lag 
specifications. There are basically no differences as far as the main outcome is concerned. 
Moreover, proximity is shown to play a role in explaining propensity to defraud over and above the 
measures of social capital and network strength, whereas distance does not. There can be several 
explanations for that. First of all, and rather trivially, fraudsters may operate not just in the province 
where the vehicles are registered but also in neighboring ones. Additionally, the cultural traits 
helping explain fraudulent behavior may be due less to geographical characteristics related to 
distance than to other cultural and historical factors, such as belonging to a city state in the Middle 
age, or living in a province which formed part of the State of the Church or the Kingdom of the Two 
Sicilies. Guiso et al. (2013) show that a large part of the differences in the endowment of social 
capital across Italian provinces can be traced back to the political institutions prevailing in the 
Middle Ages and, in some cases further back in time to the Pre-Roman period.  
  
                                               
14
 Several papers have analyzed the spatial dimension of criminal activity, for example Zenou (2003), 
Glaeser et al. (1996). 
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Table 10: Estimation results: Spatial lag model 
 (1) (2) (3) 
lag(proximity)  0.146
***
  
  (0.0529)  
    
lag(distance)   0.00933 
   (0.0172) 
    
GDP above mean -0.504 -0.404 -0.274 
 (0.462) (0.465) (0.435) 
    
GDP below mean 0.642 0.702 0.390 
 (0.591) (0.597) (0.561) 
    
GDP,  mean -2.666
***
 -2.257
***
 -2.277
***
 
 (0.736) (0.657) (0.672) 
    
Unemp. rate above mean 0.0743
***
 0.0840
***
 0.0542
**
 
 (0.0270) (0.0278) (0.0244) 
    
Unemp. rate below mean -0.0156 -0.0157 -0.0205
*
 
 (0.0121) (0.0122) (0.0115) 
    
Unemp. rate,  mean 0.00789 0.00943 0.0116 
 (0.0245) (0.0228) (0.0230) 
    
Organized crime 0.0190 0.0148 0.00119 
 (0.0400) (0.0369) (0.0369) 
    
Days(/365) for a 1st degree sentence 0.0873 0.0819 0.0789 
 (0.0557) (0.0519) (0.0524) 
    
Blood donations per 10,000 inhabitants -0.965
***
 -0.878
***
 -0.943
***
 
 (0.324) (0.303) (0.306) 
    
 % living in small villages 0.000221 0.000581 -0.00502 
 (0.00849) (0.00798) (0.00767) 
    
 % living in large cities 0.00978
***
 0.00863
***
 0.0101
***
 
 (0.00294) (0.00281) (0.00277) 
    
Deviation from avg. premium 1.329 1.817 0.261 
 (1.141) (1.172) (0.984) 
    
Avg. premium, mean 5.135
***
 4.605
***
 3.874
**
 
 (1.768) (1.592) (1.571) 
Observations 824 824 824 
 Dependent Variable: number of MTPL fraudulent claims per 10,0000inhabitants. Robust and province- 
clustered std. errors        
Additional Regressors, not shown: share of population aged 20 to 40 and over 65, vehicles per squared 
km, share of vehicles over 4 years old, macroregional dummies 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01 
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8.2 ALTERNATIVE DEFINITIONS OF SOCIAL CAPITAL  
 
In the baseline regression I use blood donation, which is one of most common indicator of social 
capital: the altruism implied by giving blood is often considered the outcome of strong civic norms 
and engagement. However these are multi-faceted phenomena than may not be captured by a 
single indicator: moreover differences in blood donations across provinces can be due also to other 
factors, such as demography (people older than 65 cannot donate). Therefore, as a robustness 
check I consider other indicators of social capital15, which may measure other dimensions of social 
capital, in particular I consider:  
• Turnouts to referendums: I average the participation rate in the two ref-erenda that took place in 
1999 and 2001. Referenda are on well identified issues with national importance and voting is not 
mandatory; a high rate of participation can then be interpreted as a sign of engagement in public 
issues, the outcome of strong networks.  
• Participation to sport clubs: Members of sport club per 1,000 persons. One may think of these 
groups as channels through which values and trust are learnt and shared.  
• Daily newspapers sold: number of daily newspapers sold per 1,000 persons. Reading a 
newspaper can be seen as an investment in the knowledge of public affairs, leading to larger 
involvement in collective action and public life. Putnam (2000) found that people who regularly read 
newspapers are more likely to vote, volunteer more frequently for community projects, visit friends 
more frequently, and build tighter relationships with their neighbors. The results (Table 11) show 
that the impact of social capital remains signif-icant regardless of the way it is measured.  
  
                                               
15
 Data are taken from Cartocci (2007) [10] 
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Table 11: Estimation results: Alternative measures of social capital 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
GDP above mean -0.614 -0.490 -0.607 -0.500 
 (0.541) (0.520) (0.537) (0.509) 
     
GDP below mean 0.787 0.617 0.759 0.656 
 (0.713) (0.685) (0.709) (0.674) 
     
GDP,  mean -2.818
***
 -2.455
***
 -2.873
***
 -2.526
***
 
 (0.811) (0.793) (0.834) (0.776) 
     
Unemp. rate above mean 0.0820
**
 0.0735
**
 0.0816
**
 0.0744
**
 
 (0.0326) (0.0312) (0.0317) (0.0303) 
     
Unemp. rate below mean -0.0132 -0.0153 -0.0137 -0.0142 
 (0.0134) (0.0129) (0.0134) (0.0128) 
     
Unemp. rate,  mean 0.00749 0.00839 0.0189 0.0201 
 (0.0254) (0.0253) (0.0270) (0.0257) 
     
Organized crime 0.0254 0.00577 0.0544 0.0222 
 (0.0432) (0.0424) (0.0492) (0.0435) 
     
Days(/365) for a 1st degree sentence 0.0879 0.0896 0.0604 0.0808 
 (0.0585) (0.0572) (0.0645) (0.0601) 
     
Blood donations  -0.963
***
    
 (0.338)    
     
Avg. turnout at  referenda  -0.0225
**
   
  (0.00938)   
     
Members of charities/ 1000 people     
     
     
Participation to sport clubs    -0.0985 
    (0.0724) 
     
Newspapers sold/1000 people   -0.00631
***
  
   (0.00237)  
     
 % living in small towns 0.00259 -0.000189 0.00930 0.00386 
 (0.00992) (0.00966) (0.0104) (0.00957) 
     
% living in large cities 0.00938
***
 0.00926
***
 0.00823
**
 0.00731
*
 
 (0.00324) (0.00316) (0.00351) (0.00377) 
     
Deviation from avg. premium 1.809 1.351 1.848 1.442 
 (1.621) (1.550) (1.554) (1.497) 
     
Avg. premium, mean 5.666
***
 4.885
**
 7.007
***
 5.016
**
 
 (2.051) (2.015) (2.358) (2.007) 
Observations 824 824 824 824 
Dependent Variable: number of MTPL fraudulent claims per 10,0000inhabitants. Robust and province- clustered std. 
errors        
Additional Regressors, not shown: share of population aged 20 to 40 and over 65, vehicles per squared km, share of 
vehicles over 4 years old, macroregional dummies 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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9.CONCLUDING REMARKS  
 
Some of the results of this paper have general implications, not restricted to insurance. First of all it 
is shown that the business cycle may affect the incidence of fraud over and above the impact on 
pecuniary incentives. Morality -at least as far as a relatively minor offense like insurance fraud is 
concerned-appears to depend on economic conditions, especially when the labor market is 
buffeted by a large negative shock like the large recession that hit the economy starting in the 
second half of 2008. This can be both the effect of economic necessities partially trumping moral 
values and the consequence of a reduction in the trust towards the financial sectors documented in 
other studies. It would be interesting to test whether social capital has the same time varying 
impact on other, more harmful, forms of crime.  
The other original contribution of the paper is showing that, other things being equal, contract 
terms  affect the propensity to cheat; making up or inflating claim is more widespread in provinces 
where the average premium paid is higher (because of reasons other than fraud). The impact the 
perceived costs and benefits of a contract on the incentive to cheat may be explored in other areas 
and provide important insight on the relationship between, for example, the perceived quality of 
public services and the incidence of tax evasion.  
Thirdly, the impact of economic fluctuations on frauds is asymmetric: propensity increases when 
unemployment goes up but is not reduced by improvements in the labor market: this is consistent 
with some sort of hysteresis that features in other theoretical and empirical analyses. Additionally, 
the analysis developed in this paper has shown that motor insurance fraud is in many ways, a 
crime like the others: it is more widespread in poorer areas, as it probably works as a structural 
supplement or replacement to labor income, and its diffusion is higher in provinces where civic 
values are weaker and a larger share of population lives in large cities where the indirect 
enforcement provided by informal networks is less tangible.  
The findings of this paper are relevant for the insurance industry. First of all, reducing the costs of 
MTPL insurance can provide a non-negligible help in fighting frauds. A discussion on the extent of 
competition and profit margins in the Italian motor insurance industry is obviously beyond the 
scope of this paper; however any measure reducing the cost of protection, by for example cutting 
administration or legal costs might help curb frauds. Reducing the level of compensation (which 
account for 70% of the costs borne by insurers to provide cover) would be in theory a more 
effective alternative, but it could backfire. It would entail curbing and standardizing the entitlements 
prescribed by law to those suffering bodily injuries and controlling more tightly the expenditure on 
car reparations (by, for example, obliging drivers to have their cars repaired in some specific 
garages), and this may raise among policyholders the feeling of being exploited by the insurance, 
possibly increasing the propensity to defraud.  
  
27 
 
APPENDIX  
 
Table A1: Variable Description and data sources  
Variable Description Source 
Frauds Number of fraudulent MTPL claims IVASS 
Vehicles  Number of registered motor vehicles  ISTAT  
Premiums  Total MTPL premiums collected in  the province  IVASS  
GDP  Per capita nominal GDP in the province  ISTAT  
CPI  Consumer Price Index for the province  ISTAT 
Unemployment  Unemployment Rate in the province  ISTAT  
Population aged 
20-40  
Total population between 20 and 40 in 2001  ISTAT   
Population aged 60 
or more  
Total population aged 60 or more  ISTAT   
Judicial Efficiency  Years needed to get  to a first degree sentence in the 
court  located in the province, average  between the 2000 
and 2007 data  
ISTAT  
Organized Crime  Incriminations for criminal association  per 100K 
inhabitants, 2000--2005 average  
ISTAT  
Blood donations  Blood donations per 10K inhabitants, 2002  Ministry of 
Health  
Referenda turnout  Average turnout at the  1999 and 2011 referenda  Ministry of 
Interior  
Sport clubs  Number of members of sport  clubs per 10K inhabitants  Cartocci(2007)  
Newspaper 
diffusion  
Daily newspapers bought  per 10K inhabitants, 2001-2 
average  
ISTAT  
% in small towns % of population living in villages  with less than 2000 
inhabitants, 2001 
ISTAT 
% in big cities % of population living in cities  with morethan 250K 
inhabitants, 2001 
ISTAT 
Fatal accidents  Share of fatal road accidents in the total  ISTAT  
Rainfall Annual rainfall in the province ISTAT 
Fuel consumption Per vehicle consumption  ACI 
Share of National 
routes 
% of national routes in the total (in Kilometers) ISTAT 
ACI: Automobile Club ISTAT: National Institute for Statistics IVASS: Insurance Regulation Authority 
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1.INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION 
 
In 2008, the biggest bailout in history prevented the failure of a large insurance company, AIG. This 
was coupled, in Europe, with substantial amounts of public money being used to rescue and 
recapitalize financial conglomerates with sizeable insurance activities. Despite AIG paying back 
bailout funds in the following years, concluding repayments in 2012, this has raised the question of 
whether insurance companies can become an important source of systemic risk and, if so, which 
entities should be regulated and how. Since 2012, international regulators have proposed a new 
framework aimed at identifying and regulating Global Systemically Important Insurers (G-SIIs). This 
framework foresees stricter oversight of accounts and practices, the requirement for the 
designated companies to prepare a plan allowing an orderly resolution of the entity in case of 
severe distress and, above all, envisages an additional capital requirement to which G-SIIs will be 
subjected, the Basic Capital Requirement (BCR). 
This paper seeks to assess how financial markets have reacted to the introduction of this 
regulation between the end of 2011 and the end of 2015. In particular, I try to gauge to what extent 
insurance companies designed as systemically important, or those who may be so in the future, 
enjoy a “too-big-to-fail” (TBTF) premium and/or whether the imposition of additional capital 
requirements has been perceived as burden. In order to distinguish with precision which entities 
are liable to fall under the new measures I explore the different layers of regulation recently 
proposed for domestically and internationally active insurance groups. Following what is being 
done for other components of the financial industry (especially banks) I use a time-tested event 
study methodology. 
The results show that this regulation does matter to investors, as the key steps of the regulation 
were accompanied by statistically significant abnormal returns for the equity of the entities affected. 
Investors were able to identify which companies would be designed as G-SII a year and a half 
before the official designation, and the positive reaction to the extension of the framework for 
systemically important banks to insurance companies can be thought as the perception of a 
valuable “too- big-too-fail” implicit guarantee, in line with what was found in similar studies on the 
banking sector. However, when details emerged, after the formal designation, on what arguably is 
the most important policy measure, the Basic Capital Requirement, G-SIIs experienced negative 
abnormal returns, which can be seen as a gauge of the price of the TBTF guarantee. This 
interpretation is corroborated by the fact that both the first–positive-effect and the second-negative-
effect are stronger for more leveraged entities. 
The overall impact of the regulation so far is not very large, slightly below what found for banks. 
Considering the group  of G-SIIs, the cumulated abnormal return of the events, when they are 
statistically significant, is 0.58%. The -0.18% return differential with respect to a group of large 
multinational insurers which are not designated as systematic indicates that, so far, the price of the 
TBTF guarantee is perceived as slightly higher than its value. These findings, along with the results 
of the responsiveness of abnormal results to company characteristics, can hopefully inform the 
debate on the regulation and provide support for the next stages. 
In Section 2 I briefly describe the cases of public bailouts of insurance companies during the 
2007/8 financial crisis and sketch the new regulatory framework for global insurers that is being 
developed. Section 3 illustrates the differences between the banking and insurance business, the 
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merits and limitations of capital-based regulation applied to insurance intermediaries and the 
evidence available so far on the TBTF premium in insurance. Section 4 summarises the 
methodology utilised. The results are shown in Section 5 and discussed in Section 6. Section 7 
concludes. 
 
1. THE INSURANCE SECTOR, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE NEW REGULATION 
 
The insurance sector was not spared by the global financial crisis and some groups had to be 
bailed out by governments or central banks. Towards the end of 2008, as a consequence of the 
rapidly escalating losses on its CDS portfolio, AIG, one of the largest insurers in the world, had to 
be bailed out by the US government. In September 2008 the Federal Reserve recapitalized AIG for 
USD 85 billion, in exchange for 79.9% of AIG equity; one year later, escalating uncertainty over the 
future of the company forced the Fed to pledge another USD 37.8 billion. This amounted to the 
largest bailout in history. On top of that, AIG was forced to sell part of its insurance business. More 
specifically, the amount disbursed to support AIG reached USD 184.6 billion in April 2009. In 
return, AIG paid interest plus dividends on the received funding and US Treasury obtained a 92% 
ownership share in the company. As of December 14, 2012, the government assistance for AIG 
concluded. All Federal Reserve loans were repaid and the Treasury sold all of the common equity 
obtained through the support (Webel, 2013). 
 
During the subprime crisis, other large US insurance companies, in addition to AIG, received public 
bailout funds through the TARP scheme, many others applied for it and others benefited from 
capital relief because of ad hoc regulatory changes. Many of them came under distress as the 
large losses in their investment portfolio, coupled with long-term guarantees to policyholders, 
quickly eroded their capital base. Others, writing financial guarantees to other firms, were unable to 
pay the claims related to the defaults of mortgage-backed securities. Finally, several life insurers 
qualified for public bailout because of their status as bank holding companies16.   
In Europe, public support was given to the insurance subsidiaries of banks (such as RBS in the UK 
and Fortis in Belgium) and, to three large Dutch financial conglomerates: ING, Aegon and SNS 
Reaal. Within the framework of a Europe-wide financial plan, €30 billion were made available to 
prevent a liquidity shortfall; €14 billion were actually used. 
Regulators have started responding to the problems that surfaced in 2007/8 within a wider 
framework for the regulation of insurance activity at the global level. The measures aim to target 
two issues: 1) how to regulate large and complex groups operating under different jurisdictions and 
2) how to mitigate the contribution of the insurance sector to financial systemic risk. The focus of 
this paper is on the latter set of measures. 
In order to respond to the growing complexity of the global insurance business17 the body in charge 
of coordinating insurance regulation internationally, the International Association of Insurance 
Supervisors (IAIS) has drafted a framework of globally accepted principles framing the supervisory 
activity, called Insurance Core Principles (ICPs). This is a set of principles and standards intended 
to help local supervisors design and implement a more effective supervision. These principles, 
                                               
16
 Schwarcz & Schwarcz (2014) 
17
 See Schoenmaker, Osterloo, & Winkels (2008) for a description on how the globalisation of the insurance 
industry is changing the structure of large multinational groups, leading to the centralisation of some 
activities. Cummins & Venard (2007) provide some fitting examples of the tension between the existence of 
a global structure and the need to comply to strict national regulation and market practice. 
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which are not mandatory, are to be applied to any insurance company, on both a legal entity and 
group-wide level, in an attempt to cover all aspects of the regulatory activity, from the powers of the 
supervisor, to the set-up of the risk management framework and to the prevention of fraud and 
money laundering18 .  
The ICPs have then been extended to create the Common Framework for the Supervision of 
International Insurers (ComFrame), a set of requirements specifically focused on the group-wide 
supervision of internationally active insurance groups (IAIGs): an IAIG is an entity which writes 
premiums in at least three jurisdictions, with at least 10% of them outside the home market, and 
which has total assets of at least USD 50 billion or gross written premiums of at least USD 10 
billion, based on a three-year average. No distinction is made either between primary insurers and 
reinsurers or among pure life or P&C insurers and composite entities. The IAIS has so far refrained 
from publishing a list of the IAIGs, the number of which should be around 50 worldwide, according 
to press estimates. A crucial feature of the ComFrame is the provision of an additional capital 
charge to be applied to large international insurance groups; the details on how this capital charge 
will operate are to be disclosed in late 2016. 
 
In addition to the ComFrame, new regulation is being drafted in order to minimise the contribution 
of the insurance industry to systemic risk. The starting point is of course to assess which parts of 
the insurance business may be a source of systemic risk. A discussion of what in the insurance 
business constitutes a source of systemic risk is clearly beyond the scope of this paper, and in-
depth analysis of the issue can be found in several recent surveys19.   
 
In May 2011 the IAIS presented its thinking on the matter, and sketched the possible regulatory 
responses (IAIS, 2011). First of all, the IAIS states that traditional insurance activity is not a source 
of systemic risk, as it entails underwriting risks that are (i) idiosyncratic (ii) not correlated with each 
other (iii) not influenced by the business cycle.   
 
However, as shown by the AIG case, insurance groups can contribute to systemic risk via non-
traditional activities, which have rapidly increased in size and scope. In life insurance, the 
existence of financial guarantees on capital and, above all, minimum guaranteed returns attached 
to many products complicate the risk profile with respect to standard, pure risk, products. The 
collapse in asset prices or yields may leave some insurers unable to pay the guaranteed returns, 
leading potentially to insolvency; the exposure of life insurers to the same asset classes can lead 
rapidly to contagion. Other problems could come from non-insurance activities such as trade in 
derivatives, used to hedge assets returns.  In non-life insurance,  systemic risk is restricted to very 
specific lines of business, such as the supply of credit protection in the form of credit insurance, 
credit guarantees and derivatives (especially CDS). 
 
The IAIS argues that, given the overall small size of non- traditional insurance, the potential 
contribution to systemic risk by the industry should be limited. However, other considerations, 
related to the size of the entities and their geographical reach must be taken into account. Insurers 
are large institutional investors, holding large positions in fixed income securities; therefore a main 
source of risk is linked to large drops in bond prices, not to mention defaults. 
 
While systemic risk can arise due to the linkages between insurers and banks, the connections 
within the industry are much less a case for concern. As shown in Figure 1, there are profound 
differences in the way insurance companies and banks are interconnected. The banking networks 
allow for the possibility of distress in an entity to spread quickly to the rest of the industry,  as 
shown by the freeze in the European interbank market in 2009 and 2011.  
 
                                               
18
 See IAIS (2011) for a detailed list of the areas of application 
19
 See, among many others, Eling and Pankoke (2014), Cummings and Weiss  (2013) and Geneva 
Association (2010). 
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In insurance, on the other hand, the structure is normally highly hierarchical. There are almost no 
linkages among primary insurers; therefore, there is not a network comparable to the interbank 
market. Risks in the insurance sector are redistributed by reinsurance companies; they receive 
risks from insurers and may share part of it with other reinsurers via retrocessions.  he insurer-
reinsurer relationship can have non-negligible implications for systemic risk, according to IAIS20. 
The reinsurance market appears to be highly concentrated, and this leads to a strong 
interconnection between reinsurers and primary insurers ceding business to them. In principle the 
failure of a reinsurer may create problems as several contracts may be cancelled, leaving insurers 
without protection for tail risks, since contracts are very specific and difficult to be rewritten quickly.  
 
Figure 1: Insurance and banking networks compared 
(Re) insurance network Banking network 
 
 
Source: Radice (2010) 
 
 
Based on the considerations outlined above, IAIS has set up a framework to designate which 
insurance groups are systemically important (IAIS, 2011), and devised specific policy measures for 
them (IAIS, 2012a). The designation was based on a set of indicators related to: 
 
- Size: the importance of an entity increases with the amount of services provided; however a 
large size is also a “prerequisite for effective risk pooling and diversification  
- Global activity: the extent of international activity is a proxy of the negative externalities that 
distress may generate 
- Interconnectedness: interlinkages with other institutions may give rise to systemic risk 
- Non-traditional and non-insurance (NTNI) activities: activities such as investing substantially in 
the bond market or entering into derivative contracts are thought to be the biggest potential 
sources of systemic risk 
- Substitutability: the difficulty of replacing the services provided by an institution in distress 
increases its systemic importance 
 
This indicators-based methodology was complemented by soft information on specific features of 
the companies and their products, gathered through interviews with national supervisors.  
 
On July 18th 2013 nine insurance groups were designed as systemically important (Global 
Systemically Important Insurers, G-SIIs). There were five European companies, Allianz (Germany), 
AXA (France), Assicurazioni Generali (Italy), Aviva and Prudential (UK), three from the US, AIG, 
MetLife and Prudential Financial, and a Chinese one, Ping An. In November 2014 the designation 
for these groups was confirmed, with no additions to the list. It changed in October 2015, with 
Generali being replaced by the Dutch insurer Aegon. 
 
                                               
20
 For a completely opposite view see Kessler (2013) 
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Together with the first list, a set of policy measures for G-SIIs was decided. It includes the 
following21: 
 
- Systemically important insurers will be subjected to a more intensive and coordinated 
supervision, on top of the other requirements determined by national (and supranational, in 
case of EU insurers) authorities. Moreover, plans to restrict non-traditional and non-insurance 
businesses and separate them from the mainstream activities may be envisaged. 
- Increased resolvability of groups or parts of them, in order to improve the supervisor’s ability to 
resolve an entity in distress, minimising the impact on the rest of the financial system and the 
taxpayer’s exposure to the risk of loss.  G-SII are required to present a plan detailing how to 
handle the restructuring in case of failure 
- Higher Loss Absorbency (HLA): a higher level of capitalisation will be required given the risk G-
SIIs pose to the global financial system. The initial step is constituted by a Basic Capital 
Requirement (BCR). The BCR is to be calculated using a factor based approach using risk 
weights related to different areas of activities, and applied on a group wide basis22. This will be 
replaced at some point by a Global Insurance Capital standard (ICS), which will be applied to 
all IAIGs.  
 
The resolution plans were submitted to the regulator during the summer 2014 and, after a 
discussion begun in October 2013, in November 2014 the model to calculate the BCR was 
presented. The details on the HLA were published in October 2015. From 2019, G-SIIs will be 
required to hold a level of capital no lower than the BCR. Figure 2 summarises the different layers 
of regulations and the types of companies affected by each of them. 
 
The new regulatory framework creates three groups of insurers: 
 
1) Those that are too small or focused on just one market to be subjected to the ComFrame 
2) The IAIGs that will have to adopt the ComFrame 
3) A subset of the IAIGs, determined on an annual basis, deemed to be systemically 
important, to which the G-SII regulation will apply 
 
It follows that insurers belonging to group 1 will never be subjected to the G-SII regulation, 
whereas those in group 2 may be. In the empirical exercise I will exploit this fact to assess the 
impact of the evolution of the regulation on the equity prices of different groups of companies. 
 
Figure 2: The regulatory framework 
Type of Entity: Legal Entity Group IAIGs G-SIIs 
 
Supervisory requirements and actions 
1
st
 Tier: Insurance 
Core Principles 
ICPs applied  to 
legal entities only 
ICPs applied to legal entities and groups 
2
nd
  Tier: 
ComFrame   
ComFrame 
3
rd
  Tier: 
G-SIIs Package    
G-SIIs package 
Source: Adapted from IAIS (2013) 
                                               
21
 For a quick presentation of the measures see IAIS (2014b) 
22
 The details on how it is to be computed can be found in IAIS (2014a) 
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The process of identifying the systemically important insurers has so far spanned over four years. 
These are the most salient events, which will be considered in the empirical analysis. 
1) November 15th, 2011: The IAIS publishes a document on the relationship between insurance 
activity and systemic risk (IAIS, 2011) and sets a list of which activities undertaken by 
insurance groups can be a source of systemic risk. It contains also the first, tentative, list of 
policy measures to be taken in order to mitigate the contribution of the insurance industry to 
systemic risk. 
2) January 10th 2012:  The Financial Stability Board (FSB), the international body in charge of 
regulating the whole financial system, announces that the supervisory framework for 
systemically important financial institution will be extended to global systemically important 
insurance companies and other types of financial institutions23. No details are provided on 
how or when this would be done and how to define systemically important insurers. 
3) May 31st, 2012: IAIS releases its proposed assessment methodology for the identification of 
G-SIIs.  
According to the Financial Times (Masters & Gray, 2012)  
“Some 48 insurance groups in 13 countries are being targeted by global regulators for 
possible designation as “systemically important”, a label that could lead to higher capital 
requirements and limits on business lines.” 
4) July 18th 2013: The list of G-SIIs is published, together with the revised list of policy 
measures.  
5) December 16th 2013: The IAIS publishes, for public consultation, the proposed methodology 
for the calculation of the Basic Capital Requirement to be applied to GSII. 
6) October 5th 2015.  The details of the Higher Loss Absorbency Requirement for Global 
Systemically Important Insurers are published24. The IAIS paper stipulates how the extra 
capital requirement needed on top of the BCR are to be calculated. 
7) November 3rd 2015.The G-SII list is updated, with Assicurazioni Generali being replaced by 
Aegon  
2. THE ROLE OF CAPITAL AND THE “TOO-BIG-TO FAIL” PREMIUM 
 
Investors’ assessment on the measure is likely to be driven to a large extent by the result of the 
trade-off between the expectation of a “too-big-to-fail” premium enjoyed by systemically important 
insurers and its cost, in terms of higher administrative charges and above all, higher and costlier 
capital requirements.  
The G-SIIs’ regulation is based on a blueprint taken from banking prudential regulation, in which 
capital buffers clearly play a key role. However, this can be different, given the specificities of the 
two industries. While banks and (life) insurers share the role of channelling savers’ funds into 
investment and of large investors in financial markets, major differences emerge in several 
respects (Thimann, 2015). For the purpose of this analysis the most important ones are about the 
role of debt and capital, and therefore leverage. 
                                               
23
 See http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/2012/01/meeting-of-the-financial-stability-board-in-basel-on-10-
january/ 
24
 See IAIS, 2015 
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Insurers, being pre-funded, do not need to issue much debt and, crucially, do not do that to finance 
core activities25.  Financial assets are acquired using the insurance premiums already earned, and 
not issuing additional liabilities. Therefore, while a higher capital charge will slow down asset 
accumulation and leverage in bank, the same will not happen in insurance, as the size of the asset 
size is mostly determined by the amount of premiums written. 
As explained in Plantin & Rochet (2007), Chapter 4, in the traditional insurance business, capital 
serves as a buffer. If the proceeds from the sale of assets (which can take a long period and be 
conducted smoothly given the high liquidity of most assets  ) is not enough to cover all the claims, 
capital is used to pay the remaining claims, and only if it is depleted the claimholders suffer losses.  
It works somehow in the same way as the deductible in a non-life insurance contract. Therefore, 
for insurers “raising capital […] means that there are (even) more assets available to cover the 
liability stream […], but such additional capital will be consumed, if at all, at the end of the process 
and has no crisis prevention or stabilisation function” (Thimann, 2015, page 376).   
Additionally, bail in is built in in most of the traditional life contracts as a participation to the gains 
(or losses) of the financial portfolios where their premiums are invested. This works as an 
additional buffer on top of capital. Unit-linked contracts with no guarantees on the amount invested 
entail would be, by definition, bailed in by policyholders26. 
In non-life insurance, the policyholder’s claim to be compensated is guaranteed by the law 
regardless of the return from the investment of provisions. Policyholders are protected by the 
imposition of very prudent provisioning criteria, strong constraints on the asset classes in which 
provisions can be invested and/or by the requirement to hold extra capital over and above the 
technical provisions.  As such, in these lines of business, a bail in is ruled out. 
Therefore, as far as the bulk of the business is concerned, the specificity of insurance may call into 
question the usefulness of capital surcharges as systemic risk mitigating tool; as a consequence, it 
may be argued that any new regulation that increases surcharges may be perceived simply as an 
additional cost and investors may react negatively to news of their introduction. 
Another crucial issue is whether insurers can be considered “too-big-too-fail”, thus raising the 
expectations of a public bailout in case of distress. As pointed out by Schwarcz & Schwarcz 
(2014), most of the U.S. insurers that received government support as a consequence of the 
2007/8 crisis were not “too-big-to-fail” in terms of size, but experienced distress due to the strong 
exposure to the mortgage backed securities (both as liabilities for the companies writing credit 
insurance and as assets for life insurers) and the strong interconnections with other parts of the 
financial markets. The same applies for Europe, where it was mostly the banking and asset 
allocation arms of financial conglomerates that led to the distress which triggered the bailout.  
                                               
25
 Normally debt is issued for M&A operations or to acquire fixed assets. 
26 However, the existence of guarantees on the premiums invested and of minimum return of course 
changes the conclusion. In this case an adequate level of capital woks as a buffer against adverse changes 
in the price and yields of financial assets. Recently, Berdin & Gründl (2015) develop a stylised model of a 
German life insurance companies and show that, in a scenario of prolonged low interest rate, quite a large 
number of companies with an insufficient level of capitalisation would run the risk of going bust as the yield 
on investment remains below the guaranteed returns for a prolonged period 
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Thus, it may be argued that the bailout was caused mostly by the activity undertaken by some 
insurers rather than by their size or core business. However, given the evidence on AIG and the 
large Dutch conglomerates presented in Section 2, one could argue that, in case of other crises, 
large insurers could benefit from public bailout given: 
- The role they play in providing long term savings to large number of people and the fact that 
the failure of a life insurer could lead to loss of confidence in the industry as a whole 
- The weight of their investment in some asset classes (for example, government and sovereign 
bonds); distress could trigger a fire sale of assets leading to potentially destabilising effects on 
prices. However, the extent of the sales may be limited by the ALM strategy aimed at reducting 
the  maturity mismatch. 
- The possibility that large losses in policyholder wealth due to the financial distress of an insurer 
and or the plunge in its equity price may propagate to other parts of the financial markets, 
undermining the confidence in the whole system. Figure 3 plots the dynamic correlation 
between the prices of CDS of ING and Aegon’s debt. The unfolding of the subprime crisis in 
the final months of 2007 led to a spike in the correlation between the perceived default risks. 
According to the regulator, two main arguments supported the intervention (IAIS, 2011): 
- Large losses in the investment portfolios of the insurance business led to a drop in solvency 
ratio; the ensuing chaos in financial markets exposed the banking arms to severe liquidly 
problems, preventing the access to market to restore the capital buffers of the insurance 
business. 
- In a conglomerate, the loss of confidence in the banking or insurance sector may have 
propagated to the other sectors, and then to the rest of the financial system. 
 
All this suggest that the existence and size of the TBTF premium is something that has ultimately 
to be assessed empirically. 
Figure 3: Dynamic Conditional Correlation* between CDS prices: ING and Aegon 
  
*Computed using the Dynamic Conditional Correlation approach presented in Engle (2002). 
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The impact on the new regulation on systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) on the 
banking sector is the subject of a few recent papers27. Less has been written so far concerning 
insurance.  
The consequences of the AIG crisis and subsequent bailout on stock prices are studied by Safa, 
Hassan, & Maroney (2013). They analyse the impact of the most important events related to the 
insurer’s near bankruptcy, assessing the extent of the contagion to other parts of the US financial 
industry. They find that the announcement of the first bailout had a positive effect on insurers’ 
equity price; in the day following the announcement average prices were 4% higher than what was 
projected by a factor model. However, immediately after the second bailout, stocks were 7% down 
with respect to the same benchmark. Equity prices of banks, brokers and savings and loans 
institutions show the same pattern. According to the authors, this indicates that, initially, the bailout 
was welcomed by market, but the later realisation that the crisis was persisting and a new capital 
injection was needed depressed the valuations. Moreover, the authors try to test whether the 
Federal Reserve perceived AIG as too big to fail. They estimate a factor model for financial 
intermediaries’ stock prices and introduce dummies for the period after the disclosure of large 
losses by AIG and before the first bailout (“crisis period”) and for that including the two bailouts 
(“post-crisis period”). If AIG was perceived as too big to fail, stock returns would have discounted 
an intervention by the Fed and the dummy for the crisis period would have been positive. 
Conversely, the dummy for the post crisis period would be negative. The estimated coefficients, 
albeit having the expected sign, are not significant and this leads the authors to conclude against 
the “too big to fail” hypothesis. 
Dewenter & Riddick  (2016) study the impact of several events on equity prices of the eight of the 
nine insurers that have been named as systemic and a “control” sample of other 22 entities with 
similar characteristics. They consider the first AIG bailout and a few steps of the evolution of the G-
SII regulation. They find that, adding the reactions to these events, designated firms enjoyed, on 
average, a “Too-Big-To-Fail” premium of roughly 10% with respect to the other entities considered. 
Moreover, the find that in the G-SII sample, positive abnormal returns in several events are 
positively correlated with companies’ leverage and standard measures of systemic risk constructed 
using equity prices. This reinforces the authors’ view of the existence of a TBTF guarantee. Their 
analysis reaches three main conclusions: 
                                               
27
 For example, Bongini, Nieri, & Pelagatti (2015) study whether the release of information concernng the 
methodology to identify SIFI, the list of designated banks and the new capital requirements had different 
impacts on the affected banks from that on non-designated banks. All in all, they find that the market reaction 
to the announcement was not very strong, slighly negative but very diverse according to the 
banks’characteristics (level of capitalisation, retail versus investment banks, etc.). Mixed but very weakly 
negative results are found by  Kleinov et al. (2015): interestingly, they find that the announcement of the 
banks designed as systemic leave their stock prices unchanged, and interpret this find as a sign that 
investors were able to predict the outcome of the designation process.  Moenninghoff et al. (2015) find that, 
overall, the new regulation has a negative impact on the banks affected, which is however mitigated by the 
positive effect of the official designation. They also find that such a positive reaction may be linked to the 
expectation of a “too-Big-to-Fail” guarantee, which is exacly what the new regulation is meant to avoid. 
Schäfer, Schnabel, & Weder di Mauro, 2015 use event studies to analyse the impact of other reforms 
enacted after the subprime crisis  in the US and Europe finding that overall, they reduce bailout expectations 
at the expense of lower equity returns. 
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“[…] first, […] equity investors conclude that the potential benefits of the TBTF guaranty outweigh 
potential compliance costs for the designated firms, with stock prices rising an average 11.7% 
across the eight announcements, corresponding to an economically significant net increase in G-
SII market value of $17.2 billion. The equity gains are not associated with a perceived fall in default 
probability, but are associated with an increase in implied asset risk of approximately 15%, and 
with a 2.5% abnormal loss to bondholders. These results are consistent with investor expectations 
that protected firms will increase asset risk in response to the moral hazard created by protection 
against default, and with investor expectations that bondholders will bear more risk and higher 
losses if the firm does fail, even with the G-SII protection. Second, we find that other large non-
designated insurance firms do not, on average, enjoy any net benefits or costs from the new 
regulatory regime[…] consistent with the market recognizing that these firms fall outside of the 
TBTF umbrella. Third, we find that investors identified the likely candidates for G-SII designation 
very early in the process, with most of the net benefit embedded in stock prices a year before the 
final announcement of specific names“ (Dewenter and Riddick, 2016 p. 32).  
Using a slightly different methodology in terms of estimation, choice of events, and considering 
both a much larger sample of securities and a different, regulation based, criterion to select the 
“control” group, I reach somewhat different conclusions. 
In the remainder of the paper I will seek to provide an empirical test of the following hypotheses: 
 
1) The G-SII regulation is not considered important and therefore the new pieces of 
information have a neutral impact on stock returns 
2) The new regulation does have an impact, the sign of which derives from the balance 
of two effects 
a. The new regulation, and especially the stricter capital requirements, may 
make insurers safer, reducing their cost of equity and propping up returns. At 
the same time, being designated as systemic implies the expectation of 
some sort of public guarantee: in this sense “systemic” can be read as “too 
big to fail” and implies an indirect subsidy which boosts returns upon 
designation announcements. 
b. The higher costs and burden entailed by the new regulation offset the 
perceived TBTF benefits, leading to negative response of stock prices to any 
announcement 
4.  METHODOLOGY  
 
The methodology used for this event study closely follows the standard one described in Campbell, 
Lo, and MacKinlay (1997) and surveyed more recently in Kothari & Warner (2007). For each 
company and announcement I estimate a simple market model using 88 observations ending three 
days before the event date; the sample length corresponds to four months of transactions and 
seeks to strike a balance between the need to have enough information to get sound parameter 
estimates and to minimise the probability of the estimates being contaminated by other events, an 
issue that is particularly relevant given the large volatility stock markets experienced in 2011-2012.   
As a regressor I use the national market index for the county where the company is listed, following 
the results of Campbell, Cowan, & Salotti (2010).  While such a choice might be questionable in an 
analysis of the banking sector, given the weight credit institutions have on the stock markets in 
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some countries, the issue is much less relevant for insurers, the capitalisation of which is much 
smaller. My preferred measure of abnormal returns is computed over the event day (or first trading 
day after that if the event happens during the weekend or on a bank holiday) and the next, in order 
to account for differences in the time zones and lagged perception of the implications of the 
regulatory actions. 
I use the daily returns of all the insurers stocks included in the Datastream World Insurance index 
that were continuously traded between June 2011 and November 2015.  I exclude brokers and 
analyse separately the impact on the six largest reinsurance companies in the world as a 
robustness check, as their prudential supervision related to systemic risk is not tackled by the 
measures under analysis28. With this, I have a list with 121 securities, which can be found in 
Appendix A. 
Then I consider different subsamples of insurers and test whether, on average, the event produced 
statistically significant abnormal returns and then if they were different across subgroups, using 
some parametric and non-parametric tests.   
Since I consider the same set of events for all the securities, the assumption of absence of cross 
section correlation (needed to aggregate abnormal returns) is not met. Therefore, in order to test 
whether the Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAAR) of each subgroup is different from 
zero I employ the  parametric test introduced by Bohemer, Musumeci & Poulsen (1991) and 
modified by Kolari & Pynnonen (2010), which adjusts the variance of the standardised CAAR 
taking into account both serial correlation and  cross section correlation across securities’ 
abnormal returns; this latter issue can also be potentially a serious problem in case of concurrent 
events affecting a subset of insurers, such as, for example, a development in the Eurozone debt 
crisis.  
I cross-check the results with those of a non-parametric test, the Generalised Sign Test explained 
in Cowan (1992). The whole procedure is explained in Appendix B. To test whether the difference 
between two groups is significantly different from zero I employ a simple t-test and a (non-
parametric) Wilcoxon rank-sum test.  Additionally, I check for the existence of other events that 
may have influenced insurers’ stock prices in the dates analysed, using event study papers related 
to the period under analysis29 and the Financial Times website. I do not find any significant event 
that can confound the results. 
As a robustness check, I consider the results obtained from two alternative models. Firstly, I 
consider a larger window, covering two days before and after the event, to account for possible 
leaks and a slower reaction to the news. Then I re-estimate the market models using for each 
security a global stock market index (the Morgan Stanley Global Index), as done in other recent 
multi-country event studies30.  
In order to test the significance of the average stock price response to the regulatory 
announcements, I split the sample in two ways. First of all, I take the full sample of insurance 
companies and form a subset of entities which meet the IAIG criteria Data on total assets are taken 
from Worldscope, and I look into company statements to determine the geographical scope of the 
                                               
28
 The decision on the list of global systemically important reinsurers and the policy measures was scheduled 
for July 2014 but has been delayed. 
29
 Altavilla, Giannone, & Lenza (2014), Stracca (2013), Gagnon, Raskin, Remache, & Sack (2011) 
30
 For example Schäfer, Schnabel, & Weder di Mauro (2015).  Securities prices are converted into US dollars 
in order to avoid spurious volatility due to exchange rate fluctuations. 
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activity. I was able to identify 38 entities meeting the IAIG criteria of size and geographical 
diversification: adding to them the six global reinsurers the final number is not too far away from 
the “around 50 insurers” affected by the regulation declared by IAIS. The remaining companies are 
grouped into the “Other” category. Then, within the IAIG sample, I consider the nine insurers 
designated as G-SII in 2013 and those not designated.  For the latest event I modify the group in 
accordance with the 2015 revision of the list. As an alternative, I just focus on the IAIGs and group 
them according to the region where they are headquartered, creating three groups: EU-based, US-
based and those located in the rest of the world.  
Subsequently, I consider just the sample of IAIGs, and focus on the performance of the individual 
securities trying to assess which characteristics explain the size of the abnormal returns in selected 
events. Given the very small number (38) of data points I focus on just size, a proxy for the weight 
of non-insurance activity and a measure of leverage.  As emphasized by Bongini, Nieri, & Pelagatti 
(2015) concerning banks, it is likely that less capitalised entities would benefit more from being 
perceived as “too-big-to-fail” and suffer more from the obligation to raise capital levels. 
5. RESULTS 
 
Table 1 details the results of the tests on cumulative returns, comparing the IAIGs that were 
designated as systemically important, the other IAIGs, and the other companies. The CAAR is 
reported in the fourth column, followed by the values of respectively the Kolari and Pynnonen (KP) 
test and the Generalised Sign Test (GST). 
The seventh column has the differences between the CAAR for the G-SIIs group and the others, 
and then the p-values of the t-test on the difference and that of the Wilcoxon rank sum test.  
The disclosure of the activities that the IAIS thinks are sources of systemic risks (Event 1) in 
November 2011 followed the publication (In July 2011) of the criteria used to define an IAIG. 
Therefore, investors were, in principle, already able to identify the type of companies liable to be 
targeted by the new regulation. Large, international insurers show negative and statistically 
significant abnormal returns on average, while companies too small and local do not record any 
significant abnormal return. At this stage, investors do not seem to be able to pick which 
companies would have been identified: the average CAAR of the G-SII group is lower than that of 
the group of the non-designed ones, but the difference is not significantly different from zero.  
A clear distinction between the subgroups also appears in the reaction to the following event, the 
FSB announcement of the extension to insurers of the regulation for systemically important 
institutions. Here, an explicit connection is made for the first time to the regulation coming into 
force for banks and that for insurance that begins to be planned. Investors appear now to be able 
to distinguish among IAIGs, and the group of G-SII enjoys a large and significant positive return 
(2.94%), which translates into a 1.08% extra-return over the other IAIGs and a 2.62% over non 
IAIGs.  
The FSB statement lacks any detail on how the specific regulation for insurance was to be framed, 
and therefore the results can be rationalised as the expectation of some form of guarantee linked 
to the systemically important status or the possibility to be designated as such. In line with some 
evidence for the banking sector and the findings of Dewenter & Riddick (2016), this can be 
interpreted as the value of the implicit “too-big-to-fail-guarantee”, conditional on the information 
available on the event date. 
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The presentation of the methodology to be employed to identify a G-SII (Event 3) does not appear 
to be related to any significant difference in the average returns, even though the CAAR for the 
SIIs group is negative and statistically significant. This can be interpreted as investor having 
already guessed which companies would have been designated and adjusting their valuation 
accordingly. This view seems to be confirmed by the fact that the formal designation itself (Event 4) 
is not met by statistically significant abnormal returns.  
On the contrary, when details emerge on the most important policy measure, the Basic Capital 
Requirement for G-SIIs (Event 5), a clear distinction shows up. The insurers that are subjected 
from the beginning to the new capital requirements experience a statistically significant -0.8% 
CAAR and the other insurers (non-IAIGs) have a statistically significant -0.6%, but the other IAIGs 
(non-G-SIIs) show no significant abnormal returns. The difference between designated and non-
designated IAIGs amounted to a statistically significant -1.26%. These results, being related to an 
estimate of the capital burden designated insurers will incur, can be interpreted as the perceived 
cost of the “too-big-to-fail guarantee”. 
The negative performance of the insurers that do not meet the IAIG criteria may be rationalised as 
the realisation by investors that these entities would not be covered by the regulation mitigating 
systemic risk, but may still suffer from a systemic event for which they may not be ready31. In other 
words, the results of Event 5 show that being outside the “club” of IAIGs has some costs, but being 
inside it and having to face systemic risk related charges is not a free lunch either and entails a 
significant stock market penalisation.  
Finally, the addition of new, more detailed information on how the HLA is calculated (Event 6) does 
not seem affect the three groups in a significant way. 
Table 2 presents the results of the analysis for the IAIGs only, which are grouped according to the 
location of the their headquarters: European Union (EU), United States (US) and rest of the world 
(ROW). This splitting is meant to capture the impact of the differences in the regulatory regimes 
with which the new framework will coexist. It must be noted, however, that the response of the 
ROW group is never significantly different from zero as long as the parametric tests are 
considered; the large heterogeneity in the regulatory frameworks is probably responsible for the 
large variability of the abnormal returns.   
The methodology proposed by the IAIG to identify systemically important insurers (Event 3) is 
viewed by investors as more damaging for European concerns than for US ones, whereas the 
difference with those in the rest of the world is not significantly different from zero. When the single 
most important measure is tackled -- the discussion of the details of the calculation of the BCR 
(Event 5) -- it is the US group that records a negative differential with respect to the EU-based 
insurers.  
The publication of the HLA calculation details has a negative impact on large US-based insurers, 
but the difference with respect to entities based elsewhere is not statistically significant. 
In order to assess the robustness the results, especially as far as the ability of investors to pick 
which companies would have been affected by the new measures, it may be useful to compare the 
                                               
31
 As an additional robustness check I split the small insurers’ sample according to HQ location, finding no 
significant differences. 
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behaviour of primary insurers versus that of reinsurers. To this end, I add to the sample the six 
reinsurers that match the IAIGs criteria32.  
Table 3 presents the result of the split between IAIGs, other insurers and large reinsurers. 
Concerning the first event, the absence of any statistically significant CAAR for the insurance 
group and the difference with respect to IAIGs’ abnormal returns confirm the view that the 
information provided by the IAIS paper was enough to enable investors to determine which 
companies were liable to be affected by the new regulation. The same applies for Event 2; 
moreover, the slightly negative CAAR for reinsurers is an indication that investors ruled out any 
form of TBTF premium benefitting reinsurers. The positive CAAR posted in event 3 may be 
interpreted as an indication of investors reacting to the realisation that reinsurers were 
(temporarily) “off the hook” as far as systemic risk regulation was concerned. 
The results of the robustness tests are reported in Appendix C. The results obtained using a single 
global index in the market model are in line with that of the baseline model far as the size and 
significance of the events are concerned. On the contrary, moving from a two-day to a much larger 
five-day window gives more volatile results, as expected. 
Summing up, some of the regulatory announcements had a non-negligible impact on insurers’ 
stock prices. The first official documents by the IAIS mentioning systemic risk depressed the 
valuation of IAIGs, but then, when the FSB suggested that insurance and banks could somehow 
be “lumped” together as far as systemic risk regulation was concerned, IAIGs experienced positive 
abnormal returns. Additionally, investors appear to be able to distinguish the insurers most likely to 
be designated, well ahead of the formal designation. The information provided by the IAIS in its 
methodological paper seems to have been enough to enable investors to pick those which would 
have been designated, despite the fact that investors have a much narrower information set than 
the regulators.  
Finally, I utilise the information on the change in the SII list that occurred in November 2015 (Event 
7) to get an overall assessment of how financial markets value the “systemic” status. Using a SUR 
model, I regress the returns of Generali and Aegon stocks on their home market index, the STOXX 
index for financial services (to control for industry specific shocks) and three time dummies for the 
day when the new list was announced, and the day before and after. I use a sample spanning 85 
days before the event and three after it33.  It turns out that the only significant time dummy is the 
one for Generali on the event day: the coefficient is 1.07 with a t-statistic of 1.93, indicating a 
positive, but not very statistically significant positive effect of being removed from the SII list.  The 
fact that Aegon equity price does not seem to be affected by the event may indicate that firm 
characteristics matter for the assessment of the implications of the new regulation. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
32
 They are QBE (Australia), Swiss RE (Switzerland), SCOR (France), Munich Re and Hannover RE 
(Germany). Berkshire Hataway was excluded as, while listed as a reinsurer, it is in fact a large conglomerate. 
33
 The sample includes event 6, so I dummy it out 
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Table 1: Cumulative average abnormal returns, G-SIIs, other IAIGs and other insurers 
Event Date Description  CAAR KP
§
 GST
§
 Diff. Vs. SII p-val. Wilcoxon
§
 
1 
November 
15th 2011 
 
The IAIS publishes a 
document on the relationship 
between insurance activity 
and systemic risk, and sets a 
list of which activities 
undertaken by insurance 
groups can be a source of 
SR 
        
SII -1.31 0.02** 0.06**    
        
Non-SII -1.08 0.08* 0.00*** -0.23   0.35      0.46 
        
Other 0.36     0.14    0.43 -1.67  0.01*** 0.02*** 
2 
January 
10th 2012 
 
The FSB announces that the 
supervisory framework for 
systemically important 
financial institutions will be 
extended to global 
systemically important 
insurance companies and 
other types of financial 
institutions. 
        
SII 2.94     0.13   0.00***    
        
Non-SII 1.86     0.28 0.00*** 1.08 0.11       0.08* 
        
Other 0.32     0.22 0.01*** 2.62 0.00***     0.00*** 
3 
May 31st, 
2012 
The IAIS  releases its 
proposed assessment 
methodology for the 
identification of G-SIIs 
        
SII -0.23    0.03** 0.04**    
        
Non-SII -0.24     0.36   0.45 0.01 0.50  0.42 
             
Other 0.05    0.01*** 0.01*** -0.28 0.34   0.11 
4 
July 18th 
2013 
The list of G-SIIs  is 
published, together with the 
list of policy measures 
            
SII -0.20    0.26   0.30      
             
Non-SII 0.19    0.24    0.11 -0.39 0.18   0.33 
           
Other -0.15    0.45    0.39 -0.05 0.41   0.47 
5 
December 
16th 2013 
The IAIS releases the public 
consultation document on 
the calculation of the basic 
capital requirements to be 
imposed on G-SIIs 
           
SII -0.82   0.00***   0.01***    
        
Non-SII 0.44   0.20   0.31 -1.26 0.00***       0.04** 
        
Other -0.61   0.00***   0.00*** -0.21    0.21   0.22 
  
The details of the HLA are 
published 
       
  SII -0.13 0.21 0.17    
6  October 
3th 2015 
        
  Non-SII 0.26 0.41 0.25 -0.74 0.14 0.18 
          
   Other -0.23 0.28 0.17 0.10 0.46 0.47 
§
p-values. Significant at ***1% **5% *10% 
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Table 2: Cumulative average abnormal returns, IAIGs split by geography 
 
Event Date Description   CAAR KP
§
 GST
§
 Diff. Vs. EU p-val. Wilcoxon
§
 
1 
November 
15th 2011 
 
 
The IAIS publishes a document 
on the relationship between 
insurance activity and systemic 
risk, and sets a list of which 
activities undertaken by 
insurance groups can be a 
source of SR 
              
EU -1.07    0.08   0.00***       
              
US -1.33     0.03   0.02** 0.26 0.34 0.15 
              
ROW -1.08    0.48    0.07* 0.01 0.50 0.37 
2 
January 
10th 2012 
 
The FSB announces that the 
supervisory framework for 
systemically important financial 
institutions will be extended to 
global systemically important 
insurance companies and other 
types of financial institutions. 
              
EU 2.20 0.09     0.44       
              
US 2.49 0.37    0.15 -0.29 0.49 0.20 
              
ROW 1.37 0.44    0.00*** 0.83 0.15 0.28 
3 
May 31st, 
2012 
The IAIS  releases its proposed 
assessment methodology for the 
identification of G-SIIs 
              
EU -1.57 0.16    0.00***       
              
US 0.86 0.23    0.19 -2.42 0.03*** 0.12 
              
ROW 0.14 0.38    0.36 -1.70 0.09* 0.28 
4 
July 18th 
2013 
The list of G-SIIs  is published, 
together with the list of policy 
measures 
       
EU 0.29 0.33    0.03**    
       
US 0.28 0.19    0.15   0.01 0.50 0.28 
       
ROW -0.29 0.39    0.34   0.58 0.19 0.26 
5 
Dec. 16th 
2013 
IAIS releases the public 
consultation document on the 
calculation of the basic capital 
requirements to be imposed on 
G-SIIs 
       
EU 0.30 0.35    0.03** 
   
       
US -0.62 0.11    0.01***   0.92 0.01*** 0.01*** 
       
ROW 0.43 0.46    0.50 -0.13 0.50 0.34 
6 
October 
3th 2015 
The details of the HLA are 
published 
       
EU 0.13 0.45 0.41    
       
US -0.16 0.05** 0.02** 0.29 0.46 0.28 
       
ROW 0.07 0.13 0.20 0.06 0.41 0.28 
§
p-values. Significant at ***1% **5% *10% 
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Table 3: Cumulative average abnormal returns, insurers and reinsurers 
Event Date Description   CAAR KP
§
 GST
§
 Diff. Vs. IAIGs p-val. Wilcoxon
§
 
1 
November 
15th 2011 
 
 
The IAIS publishes a 
document on the relationship 
between insurance activity 
and systemic risk, and sets a 
list of which activities 
undertaken by insurance 
groups can be a source of 
SR 
              
IAIGs -1.13 0.07* 0.00***    
       
Other  0.36 0.14   0.43 -1.49 0.00***    0.00*** 
       
Reins 0.76 0.24   0.10* -1.89  0.05**       0.12* 
2 
January 
10th 2012 
 
The FSB announces that the 
supervisory framework for 
systemically important 
financial institutions will be 
extended to global 
systemically important 
insurance companies and 
other types of financial 
institutions. 
       
IAIGs 2.11 0.27  0.00***    
       
Other  0.32 0.22  0.01*** 1.79  0.00***     0.00*** 
       
Reins -0.60 0.00***    0.08* 2.71  0.07*       0.04** 
3 
May 31st, 
2012 
The IAIS  releases its 
proposed assessment 
methodology for the 
identification of G-SIIs 
       
IAIGs -0.23  0.22   0.20    
       
Other  0.05 0.01*** 0.01*** -0.28   0.26 0.18 
       
Reins 0.61  0.18 0.00*** -0.84   0.15 0.28 
4 
July 18th 
2013 
The list of G-SIIs  is 
published, together with the 
list of policy measures 
       
IAIGs 
0.10 0.37    0.14       
 
            
Other  
-0.15  0.45    0.39 0.25  0.25 0.12 
 
            
Reins 
0.82 0.11   0.01*** -0.72  0.24 0.26 
5 
Dec. 16th 
2013 
IAIS releases the public 
consultation document on 
the calculation of the basic 
capital requirements to be 
imposed on G-SIIs 
 
      
IAIGs 0.15 0.47     0.19    
       
Other  -0.61 0.00***    0.00*** 0.76  0.00***      0.01*** 
       
Reins -0.06 0.25 0.36 0.21    0.12 0.36 
          
   IAIGs 0.21 0.40 0.33    
6 
October 
3th 2015 
The details of the BCR are 
published 
       
   Other  -0.23 0.28 0.17 0.44 0.13 0.09* 
          
   Reins -0.53 0.14 0.33* 0.74 0.13 0.21 
                 §
p-values. Significant at ***1% **5% *10% 
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In order to investigate this issue I then consider the sample of the IAIGs, i.e., all the companies that 
at some point may be affected by the regulation and regress the CAAR for the most significant 
events (1, 2, and 5) on size, gearing and the importance of non-insurance activity. Moreover for 
event 5, I also a dummy for the entities headquartered in the US, in order to gauge how investors 
assess the compatibility with the global framework being developed and the existing national 
regulation. This is relevant in light of the expected developments in prudential regulation: the 
Solvency II regime, coming into force for all EU-based companies in 2016 foresees a risk based 
capital weighting scheme, whereas US companies will stick to the risk weighting scheme.  
Consider first the results for events 1 and 2 reported in Table 4 (first and second columns). They 
show that size is positively related to CAAR for both events and that Event 2 extra returns have a 
positive correlation with company’s gearing. 
If the positive abnormal returns are interpreted as an expectation of a TBTF guarantee, this 
accrues, as expected, to larger entities and those that, being more leveraged, would be more in 
need of a public bailout. The relative size of non-policyholders’ liability is not statistically significant.  
Consider then the third column, which shows the same model (plus the dummy for US insurers) 
applied to Event 5. It appears that size is no longer correlated with the response. Interestingly, in 
event 5, the relationship with gearing remains significant but switches sign: more leveraged firms 
may need extra efforts to raise capital to meet the BCR and this seems to be priced in in their 
stocks. On top of that, companies being based in the US have a stronger penalty, possibly 
suggesting a more difficult compatibility between the BCR and the local solvency regime.  
Table 4:  Determinants of Abnormal Returns in selected events 
Dep. Var: CAR Event 1 Event 2 Event 5 
Constant -10.42 -11.74 0.14 
  [-2.46]* [-2.46]* [0.04] 
        
Total asset (log) 0.57 0.59 0.10 
  [2.11]* [2.19]* [0.51] 
        
Debt/capital -0.04 0.07 -0.03 
  [-1.38] [2.52]* [-2.41]* 
        
Non policyholder 
liabilities 
-1.06 1.59 -1.51 
[-1.16] [0.79] [-1.44] 
    
Headquartered in 
the US 
  -1.40 
  [-2.98]** 
      
Observations: 38 38 38 
Adj.R-squared: 0.11 0.28 0.32 
F-statistic: 1.47 4.37 3.93 
Prob(F-stat): 0.24 0.01 0.01 
Significant at ***1% **5% *10% 
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6. DISCUSSION 
Some of the steps in the development of the regulation did cause significant abnormal returns in 
insurers’ equity prices. In order to calculate the total impact I add across events the abnormal 
returns, considering just the case when they are statistically significant at least at the 10%  for both 
the both the Kolari-Pynnonen and the Generalised Sign Test . Considering the group of G-SIIs, I 
take events 1, 2,3 and 5: the cumulated abnormal return is 0.58%. The difference with respect to 
non-designated IAIGs is statistically significant only in events 2 and 5: summing them I get -0.18%. 
Finally, the difference over non-IAIGs, considering events 1 and 2, is 0.95%.  
The first conclusion that can be drawn is that the perceived value of the TBTF guarantee related to 
being designated (or initially perceived by investors as) systemically important is relatively small, 
less than 0.6%. However, the difference with respect to IAIGs not having this status is slightly 
negative. This contrasts sharply with the nearly 12% (10.3% considering only the statistically 
significant responses) TBTF premium estimated by Dewenter & Riddick (2016), which consider a 
different set of events and put together the reaction to the first AIG bailout and only some of the 
steps of the G-SII regulation process. Some of the differences may be due to the choice of the 
events: in particular their analysis stops at the designation of the G-SIIs, while mine includes the 
publication of the details of the Basic Capital Requirement. More important, however, is the fact 
that their “control” group put together IAIGs which can be at some point designated as systemic 
with large, but just domestically focused entities which will never be designeted.  
It is, however, important to notice the quite large difference with respect to the group of smaller 
companies which do not meet the IAIG criteria, suggesting that, possibly, some form of implicit 
guarantee could come from the ComFrame regulation.  
However, the process of regulating the sources of systemic risk in insurance is at a realtively early 
stage compared with that of the banking sector and therefore the sum of the impacts may not, at 
present, be very informative. What matters more is the effect of the additional information provided 
by the events.  
Considering the G-SIIs group, only the - rather vague - statement by the FSB on the extension of 
the framework for G-SIFI to insurance was met by positive abnormal returns. The following steps, 
i.e the releases of the details on how to identify SIIs (event 3) and, crucially, how to calculate the 
BCR (event 5), were accompanied by negative abnormal results. This is likely to indicate a 
pessimistic revision of the investors’ assessment of the impact of the new regulation on insurers’ 
profitability. However, the extra information provided by the details on the HLA calculation and the 
revision of the SII list was not considered relevant by financial market.  
The revision in expectations also appears in the results of the regressions of the CAAR for events 
2 and 5 on companies’ size and, crucially, gearing. When the FSB declared that the systemic risk 
framework would also encompass insurers, the benefit in terms of extra returns was larger for 
bigger and more leveraged insurers, consistent with the TBTF premium hypothesis. However, once 
the details of the measures, and in particular the calculation of the BCR were known, size no 
longer mattered34 and more geared insurers experienced larger negative abnormal returns, 
consistent with the view that the new measures represented a higher cost for firms as they will 
have to recapitalise. Bongini, Nieri & Pelagatti (2015) find a similar result for banks. 
                                               
34
 This is consistent with the view that size is an imperfect indicator of systemic risk for banks and insurance, 
as shown by the low correlation between asset-prices based measures of systemic risk and the size of the 
individual entities. See for example, Adrian & Brunnemeier, 2016.  
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7. CONCLUSION 
This paper has sought to assess whether and to what extent financial market priced the different 
phases  of the evolution of the macroprudential framework for insurance companies.. The new 
regulation matters to investors, as some of the key steps were accompanied by statistically 
significant abnormal returns and investors seem to have understood which entities would have 
been designated as systemically important well ahead of the publication of the list.  The size of the 
abnormal returns and their evolution over time, suggest that investors’ opinions on the regulation 
have turned to moderately pessimistic once the details on the capital standards were enounced. 
Overall, the impact is not very strong, in line with what found recently by similar studies on banks. 
Gearing is an important driver of the results.  Its correlation with the cumulative results was positive 
upon the announcement of the extension of the SIFI status to insurers before turning negative 
when investors were able to estimate the cost of being systemically important in terms of capital 
requirement. This is again consistent with an evolution of market perception from an initial 
expectation of a TBTF premium to a more pessimistic assessment of the costs and burdens 
related to the new regulation, especially for US-based entities.  
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APPENDIX A: INSURERS CONSIDERED 
INTERNATIONALLY ACTIVE INSURANCE GROUPS (IAIGS) 
 
  
Name  Country 
Assets  2010 YE 
(USD '000) 
  
Designated 
as G-SII in 
2013 and 
2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AVIVA UNITED KINGDOM 591820229 
ALLIANZ GERMANY 881697289 
AXA FRANCE 1037518855 
ASSICURAZIONI GENERALI  ITALY 597900960 
PING AN INSURANCE CHINA 169752469 
PRUDENTIAL UNITED KINGDOM 419755352 
AMERICAN INERNATIONAL GROUP UNITED STATES 683443000 
METLIFE UNITED STATES 730906000 
PRUDENTIAL FINANCIAL UNITED STATES 539854000 
Non 
Designated 
AGEAS (EX-FORTIS) BELGIUM 142342814 
MANULIFE FINANCIAL CANADA 406783811 
POWER FINANCIAL CANADA 138358244 
SUN LIFE FINANCIAL CANADA 203583257 
MAPFRE SPAIN 64569551 
CNP ASSURANCES FRANCE 451545437 
AEGON (designated in 2015) NETHERLANDS 472167398 
TOKIO MARINE HOLDINGS JAPAN 188605816 
MS&AD INSURANCE GP.HDG. JAPAN 82463115 
SONY FINANCIAL HOLDINGS JAPAN 65482398 
SAMSUNG FIRE & MAR.IN. KOREA (SOUTH) 23830851 
LEGAL & GENERAL UNITED KINGDOM 524189226 
STOREBRAND NORWAY 69243952 
VIENNA INSURANCE GROUP AUSTRIA 55359872 
OLD MUTUAL UNITED KINGDOM 313392987 
RSA INSURANCE GROUP UNITED KINGDOM 33035621 
BALOISE-HOLDING AG SWITZERLAND 63711969 
SWISS LIFE HOLDING SWITZERLAND 143526673 
ZURICH INSURANCE GROUP SWITZERLAND 324302899 
STANDARD LIFE UNITED KINGDOM 239761143 
SHIN KONG FINL.HLDG. TAIWAN 64623125 
ACE SWITZERLAND 82586000 
AFLAC UNITED STATES 101039000 
CHUBB UNITED STATES 50151000 
GENWORTH FINANCIAL  UNITED STATES 111295000 
TRAVELERS  UNITED STATES 104688000 
EULER HERMES GROUP FRANCE 7404483 
HISCOX BERMUDA 5733282 
XL GROUP BERMUDA 44879826 
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 OTHER INSURERS 
Name Country 
Assets  2010 YE 
(USD '000) 
ARCH CAP. GP. BERMUDA 15770792 
CINCINNATI FINL. UNITED STATES 15095000 
AMP AUSTRALIA 82476410 
CHALLENGER AUSTRALIA 17090611 
INSURANCE AUS. GROUP AUSTRALIA 18735042 
ADMIRAL GROUP UNITED KINGDOM 2279765 
AMLIN UNITED KINGDOM 9237019 
BEAZLEY IRELAND 4946640 
PORTO SEGURO ON BRAZIL 8055497 
SUL AMERICA UNT BRAZIL 6509969 
E-L FINANCIAL CANADA 13554996 
FAIRFAX FINL.HDG. CANADA 30314468 
INDL.ALL.IN. &  FINL.SVS. CANADA 32792659 
INTACT FINANCIAL CANADA 11811103 
CATLIN GROUP BERMUDA 11806000 
CHESNARA UNITED KINGDOM 7438861 
NUERNBERGER BETS. GERMANY 31840050 
WURTTEMBERGISCHE LEB. GERMANY 41505319 
ALM BRAND DENMARK 9200129 
TOPDANMARK DENMARK 11039415 
TRYG DENMARK 9511345 
GRUPO CATALANA OCCIDENTE SPAIN 11686722 
APRIL FRANCE 1895465 
CATTOLICA ASSICURAZIONI ITALY 25941756 
MEDIOLANUM ITALY 46911913 
UNIPOL GRUPPO FINANZIARI ITALY 73506545 
VITTORIA ASSICURAZIONI ITALY 3547104 
MAX INDIA INDIA 2908440 
RELIANCE CAPITAL INDIA 5716623 
T & D HOLDINGS JAPAN 139563228 
JARDINE LLOYD THOMPSON UNITED KINGDOM 1984725 
CHINA TAIPING IN.HDG. HONG KONG 19630869 
CHINA LIFE INSURANCE 'H' CHINA 206608264 
PICC PROPERTY & CLTY.'H' CHINA 29341125 
SAMSUNG FIRE & MAR.IN. KOREA (SOUTH) 23830851 
HYUNDAI MARINE & FIRE IN. KOREA (SOUTH) 10186551 
DONGBU INSURANCE KOREA (SOUTH) 13263737 
LANCASHIRE HOLDINGS UNITED KINGDOM 2576600 
STOREBRAND NORWAY 69243952 
NOVAE GROUP UNITED KINGDOM 2325611 
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Other Insurers (Continued) 
Name  Country 
Assets  
2010 YE 
(USD '000) 
UNIQA INSU GR AG AUSTRIA 39775884 
SCB LIFE ASSURANCE THAILAND 2013043 
DISCOVERY SOUTH AFRICA 1796183 
LIBERTY HOLDINGS SOUTH AFRICA 31916917 
MMI HOLDINGS SOUTH AFRICA       NA 
SANLAM SOUTH AFRICA 48291979 
SANTAM SOUTH AFRICA 2185363 
HELVETIA HOLDING N SWITZERLAND 36315515 
SCHWZ.NATIONAL-VERSICH.- GESELL. SWITZERLAND 7519112 
VAUDOISE 'B' SWITZERLAND 10979703 
ST.JAMES'S PLACE UNITED KINGDOM 41212786 
ANADOLU HAYAT EMEKLILIK TURKEY 3631081 
CHINA LIFE INSURANCE TAIWAN 20430356 
FUBON FINL.HLDG. TAIWAN 108426390 
SHIN KONG FINL.HLDG. TAIWAN 64623125 
AMERICAN FINL.GP.OHIO UNITED STATES 32454000 
ASSURED GUARANTY BERMUDA 19247554 
ASSURANT UNITED STATES 26320588 
ARTHUR J GALLAGHER UNITED STATES 3350800 
AXIS CAPITAL HDG. BERMUDA 16373125 
BROWN & BROWN UNITED STATES 2400814 
CNA FINANCIAL UNITED STATES 54690000 
CNO FINANCIAL GROUP UNITED STATES 31060200 
HCC INSURANCE HDG. UNITED STATES 9064082 
HARTFORD FINL.SVS.GP. UNITED STATES 314621000 
LINCOLN NATIONAL UNITED STATES 193824000 
MARKEL UNITED STATES 10762326 
MARSH & MCLENNAN UNITED STATES 14105000 
OLD REPUBLIC INTL. UNITED STATES 15837400 
PROGRESSIVE OHIO UNITED STATES 21150300 
PROTECTIVE LIFE UNITED STATES 47562786 
PARTNERRE BERMUDA 23349411 
EVEREST RE GP. BERMUDA 18258870 
RENAISSANCERE HDG. BERMUDA 8138278 
TORCHMARK UNITED STATES 16159762 
UNUM GROUP UNITED STATES 57307700 
W R BERKLEY UNITED STATES 17463055 
WILLIS GROUP HOLDINGS UNITED KINGDOM 15840000 
WHITE MOUNTAINS IN.GP. BERMUDA 14034400 
ALLEGHANY UNITED STATES 6354552 
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APPENDIX B: METHODOLOGY 
 
First consider an 88-day estimation window [T0, T1], ending three days before the event and 
estimate the following model 
𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑟𝑀𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡   (A1) 
The abnormal returns are computed in the event window (T2, T3) as 
𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝑟𝑖𝑡 − ?̂? + ?̂?𝑟𝑀𝑡 (A2) 
Then they are cumulated over the event window of days ranging from  T2 and T3 , encompassing 
the event day, as 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑇2, 𝑇3) = ∑ 𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡
𝑇3
𝑡=𝑇2
(A3) 
The BMP test considers first the cumulative returns standardized for an estimate of their standard 
deviation 
𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑇2, 𝑇3) = 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑇2, 𝑇3)/𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑇2,𝑇3)  (A4) 
Where the standard deviation is corrected for the serial dependence that arises in successive 
prediction errors based on the same parameter estimates as follows 
𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑇2,𝑇3) = √(
1
(𝑇1−𝑇0)
∑ 𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡
2𝑇1
𝑡=𝑇0
) {(𝑇3 − 𝑇3) ∗ [1 +
(𝑇3−𝑇2)
(𝑇1−𝑇0)
+
(∑ 𝑟𝑀𝑡−(𝑇3−𝑇2)𝑟𝑀̅̅ ̅̅
𝑇3
𝑡=𝑇2
)
2
∑ (𝑟𝑀𝑡−𝑟𝑀̅̅ ̅̅ )2
𝑇1
𝑡=𝑇0
]} (A5) 
 
where  𝑟𝑀̅̅ ̅ is the mean of the market return over the estimation sample. 
Then the statistics on the cross-section of the N companies belonging to a group is derived as 
𝑍 =
∑ 𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑛(𝑇2,𝑇3)
𝑁
𝑛=1
√𝑁𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅
 (A6) 
where 
𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅 = √[
1
𝑁−1
∑ (𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑛(𝑇2, 𝑇3) −
1
𝑁
∑ 𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑛(𝑇2, 𝑇3)
𝑁
𝑛=1 )
2
𝑁
𝑛=1 ] (A7) 
 
Z is asymptotically distributed as a standard normal. 
 
 
However, the BMP test assumes that individual securities are uncorrelated in the cross section, 
which may not be the case when the event date is the same for all companies. Kolari & Pynnonen 
(2010) devise a modification of the BMP statistics in order to account for cross-section correlation. 
The statistics they propose is the following 
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𝑍𝐵𝑀𝑃−𝐾𝑃 = 𝑍𝐵𝑀𝑃√
1−?̅?
1+(1+𝑁)?̅?
        (A8) 
where ?̅? is the average cross-sectional correlation coefficient of the residuals of the estimated 
equation (i.e. the abnormal returns in the estimation period). This statistic is again asymptotically 
normally distributed under the null hypothesis of no effect. 
In the generalised sign (GS) test the null hypothesis is that, within a group, the share of returns 
having positive sign in the event window is equal to the fraction expected to have that sign, based 
on the estimation window. For example, considering positive returns 
?̂? =
1
𝑁
∑
1
((𝑇1−𝑇0))
∑ 𝑆𝑛𝑡
𝑇1
𝑡=𝑇0
𝑁
𝑛=1 ,   𝑆𝑛𝑡 = {
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑢𝑛𝑡 > 0
0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
   (A8) 
The test statistics is based on the normal approximation of a binomial distribution with parameter ?̂? 
and reads 
𝑍 =
𝑁0−𝑁𝑝
√[𝑁𝑝(1−?̂?)]
   (A9) 
where N0 is the number of securities in the group having on average positive residuals in the 
estimation windows. 
 In order to test for negative signs, substitute negative for positive in the definition of   𝑆𝑛𝑡 and N0. 
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APPENDIX C: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
 
Table A1: Market model with common world index 
  Event 1 2 3 4 5 6 
SII CAAR       -1.24    3.29     0.81 0.41    -0.90 0.14 
  BMP-KP 0.12    0.07*  0.10* 0.26   0.03** 0.37 
  GST 0.16    0.00**      0.36 0.11   0.02** 0.32 
Non SII CAAR       -1.02    1.67      0.80 0.18     0.35 0.88 
  BMP-KP   0.07*    0.29      0.48 0.17     0.24 0.16 
  GST     0.04**    0.00***    0.03**  0.07*     0.12     0.06** 
OTHER CAAR      -0.19    0.65     0.89 -0.25    -0.72 0.33 
  BMP-KP        0.45    0.06*   0.06** 0.37 
    
0.00*** 0.47 
  GST 0.29 0.02** 
    
0.00***      0.38    0.00*** 0.45 
SII-Non SII 
dCAAR      -0.22    1.62     0.01      0.23   -1.25 -0.74 
p-value        0.40 0.02**     0.50      0.34    0.01*** 0.14 
Wilcoxon        0.44 0.03**     0.50      0.45    0.05*** 0.20 
SII-Other 
dCAAR       -1.05    2.64    -0.08      0.66   -0.18 -0.19 
p-value      0.01***   0.00***     0.34      0.41    0.21 0.35 
Wilcoxon   0.02**   0.00***     0.11      0.47    0.22 0.28 
EU CAAR      -0.75   2.25     1.39      1.02    0.43 1.22 
  BMP-KP       0.35   0.31     0.27      0.08*    0.33     0.02** 
  GST       0.18 0.03**     0.27      0.10* 0.03**      0.01** 
US CAAR      -1.25    2.24    -0.27      0.23   -0.63 -0.79 
  BMP-KP       0.11    0.43     0.22      0.30     0.16 
         
0.00*** 
  GST     0.00***    0.38     0.17      0.01  0.05**     0.02** 
ROW CAAR     -1.40    1.71     0.76     -0.81     0.16 1.02 
  BMP-KP       0.50    0.45     0.48      0.40     0.44      0.01** 
  GST 0.04** 0.02**     0.21     0.28     0.25     0.02** 
EU-US 
dCAAR      0.50   0.00     1.67     0.79     1.06   2.01 
p-value      0.22   0.50   0.04**   0.02** 
    
0.01*** 
      
0.01** 
Wilcoxon      0.08*   0.20   0.05** 0.04** 
    
0.01*** 
    0.07* 
EU-ROW 
dCAAR      0.65 0.54 0.63 1.83 0.27 0.19 
p-value 
     0.22    0.26 0.23 
    
0.01*** 
0.34 0.39 
Wilcoxon 
 0.01***  0.03**    0.01***   0.01*** 
    
0.00*** 
    0.04** 
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Table A1: Market model with common world index (continued) 
 Event 1 2 3 4 5 6  
IAIGs CAAR -1.07 2.04 0.80 0.24 0.06 0.79  
  BMP-KP    0.08* 0.27 0.35 0.22 0.48 0.25  
  GST     0.03**      0.00***     0.04**    0.05** 0.42     0.01**  
Other CAAR 0.05 0.77 0.53 -0.33 -0.76 0.33  
  BMP-KP 0.45   0.06*  0.06* 0.37     0.00*** 0.47  
  GST 0.29     0.02**     0.00*** 0.38     0.00*** 0.45  
Reinsurers CAAR 0.96 -0.36 1.66  1.04 -0.20 0.74  
  BMP-KP 0.15       0.00***   0.08*    0.08* 0.29 0.36  
  GST 0.34    0.07*      0.00***     0.02** 0.38 0.28  
IAIGs-Other 
dCAAR -1.12 1.27 0.27 0.57 0.82 0.46  
p-value       0.01***       0.01*** 0.32   0.09*     0.01*** 0.18  
Wilcoxon     0.02**       0.01*** 0.32     0.02**     0.01*** 0.16  
IAIGs-Reins 
dCAAR -2.03 2.40 -0.86 -0.80 0.26 0.27  
p-value      0.03**   0.06* 0.13 0.22 0.41 0.36  
Wilcoxon 0.26 0.14 0.37 0.33 0.44 0.32  
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Table A2: [-2, 2] Window 
  Event 1 2 3 4 5 6  
SII CAAR -1.48  3.43   -0.22 -0.30   0.32 -0.43  
  BMP-KP 0.00***  0.05**    0.04** 0.22   0.20 0.22  
  GST 0.01***  0.01***    0.15 0.45   0.41 0.17  
Non SII CAAR -1.06  2.33   -0.66 0.25   0.32 0.33  
  BMP-KP  0.14  0.17    0.23 0.19   0.34 0.38  
  GST 0.01***  0.02**   0.05**   0.05*   0.11 0.24  
OTHER CAAR -0.34 -0.20   -0.22    -0.07  -0.10 -0.90  
  BMP-KP  0.28 0.00***    0.38     0.35  0.03** 0.05*  
  GST 0.02**  0.02** 0.07*     0.23   0.14 0.00***  
SII-Non SII 
dCAAR -0.42  1.10    0.44   -0.55   0.00 -0.76  
p-value  0.25  0.16    0.31     0.16   0.50 0.25  
Wilcoxon  0.19  0.03** 0.07*    0.40   0.18 0.46  
SII-Other 
dCAAR -1.14  3.63   0.00   -0.23    0.42   
p-value  0.00*** 0.00***   0.14    0.31 0.10*   
Wilcoxon 0.03** 0.01***   0.33    0.36    0.13   
EU CAAR -0.16 -0.66   0.30    0.00    0.27 0.83  
  BMP-KP  0.33  0.01***   0.34    0.39   0.21 0.23  
  GST  0.46  0.00***  0.02***    0.10 
  
0.04** 0.04** 
 
US CAAR -1.93  1.92   0.72    1.14  -0.79 -0.64  
  BMP-KP 0.01***  0.45 0.03**  0.03**    0.14 0.00***  
  GST 0.00***  0.00*** 0.02**    0.14   0.23 0.00***  
ROW CAAR -1.23  1.65  -1.50   -0.50   0.87 -0.44  
  BMP-KP  0.50  0.44   0.48    0.43   0.49 0.46  
  GST  0.00***  0.17   0.42   0.00***   0.13 0.39  
EU-US 
dCAAR 1.26  1.76 -1.18   -1.18   1.36 1.47  
p-value 0.09*  0.18  0.19  0.02** 0.05* 0.08*  
Wilcoxon 0.11  0.21  0.35     0.13 0.01*** 0.17  
EU-ROW 
dCAAR 0.56  2.03  1.04     0.46   -0.30 0.67  
p-value 0.30  0.08*  0.14     0.26    0.36 0.13  
Wilcoxon 0.01*** 0.03**  0.18     0.38 0.00*** 0.22  
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Table A2: [-2, 2] Window (continued) 
 
 Event 1           2 3 4 5 6 
IAIGs CAAR -1.16 2.59 -0.56 0.12 0.32 0.15 
  BMP-KP 0.12 0.16 0.15 0.32 0.33 0.49 
  GST       0.00*** 
       
0.00***   0.02** 0.14 0.19 0.44 
Other CAAR -0.31 -0.16 -0.24 -0.10 -0.16 -0.90 
  BMP-KP 0.28      0.00*** 0.38 0.35      0.03**    0.05* 
  GST     0.02**     0.02**   0.07* 0.23 0.14 
      
0.00*** 
Reinsurers CAAR 0.62 -2.92 -1.80 0.26 0.59 -2.05 
  BMP-KP 0.36 0.05 0.04 0.29 0.07      0.03** 
  GST 0.34 0.08 0.11 0.01 0.02   0.08* 
IAIGs-Other 
dCAAR -0.85 2.75 -0.32 0.22 0.48 1.05 
p-value       0.01***     0.01*** 0.15 0.34 0.03**   0.05* 
Wilcoxon      0.00*** 0.10*     0.00*** 0.00*** 0.24 0.11 
IAIGs-Reins 
dCAAR -1.78 5.51 1.24 -0.14 -0.27 2.20 
p-value 0.17   0.07* 0.14 0.45 0.40    0.05* 
Wilcoxon 0.44   0.10* 0.20 0.44 0.49 0.13 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Predicting the non-life insurance underwriting cycle, i.e. the evolution of profitability over time, is a 
key issue for industry practitioners, regulators and academics. Protracted periods of soft market, 
when protection is available at low prices, are associated with low profitability and possibly a higher 
insolvency rate among insurers. On the other hand, the price policyholders pay in certain lines of 
business, especially the mandatory ones, is a very sensitive issue regulators routinely face. 
Modelling the underwriting cycle is one of the most important task non-life actuaries perform and 
over the last three decades insurance economist have joined in the effort. The standard 
econometric model used to forecast profitability features a simple autoregressive structure for the 
variable of interest (the ratio between losses and premiums or the growth rate of premiums), at 
times complemented by lagged values of macroeconomic variables. No attempt is made to model 
the relationship between macroeconomic aggregates and claims frequency or costs, in order to 
build a causation chain running from the business cycle to insurance profitability. The present 
paper attempts to fill this gap, using aggregate data for the largest non-life line of business in the 
Italian market, Motor Third Party Liability (MTPL) and standard time series analysis. The aim of the 
paper is to introduce an innovative yet easy to implement framework companies and regulator can 
apply to forecast premium and profitability dynamics and to do scenario analysis for those lines of 
business, such as motor, where the business cycle heavily influences claims. This richer setting is 
shown to produce better forecasts of both premiums and profitability compared with traditional 
models.  
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 first provides a brief review of the economic theories 
of the underwriting cycle and then summarizes their econometric applications. Section 3 introduces 
the new modelling approach. As a background for the econometric estimation, section 4 reviews 
the most important legislative and regulatory changes which have affected the Italian motor 
insurance market over the last forty years, which are susceptible to having affected the evolution of 
claims and premiums. Section 5 details the model estimation, first testing for the presence of long 
term relationships between insurance and macroeconomic variables and then modelling the short 
term dynamics. In section 6 I compare the forecasting ability of three models: the one estimated in 
Section 5, one that explicitly considers claim dynamics but does not take into account the long term 
relationships and the standard approach to underwriting cycles modelling, assessing their accuracy 
for both premium growth and profitability. The results are discussed in Section 6, together with 
some suggested extensions of the model. Section 7 concludes. 
2. THE UNDERWRITING CYCLE: THEORY AND MEASUREMENT 
 
The underwriting cycle in property and casualty insurance can be described as 
“the alternance of soft market periods, where price and profitability are stable or falling and 
coverage is readily available to consumers, and subsequent hard market periods, where prices 
and profits increase abruptly and less coverage is available” (Harrington, Niehaus e Yu, 2013) 
Insurers receive the payments from customers before incurring the costs, therefore they have to 
set the premium level based on an expectation of future claims and adjusting for the past 
forecasting errors or for large, unpredictable shocks, like a major weather event. The evolution of 
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claims (caused mostly by factors exogenous to the insurance market, with the notable exception of 
changes in regulation) and the following adjustments in premiums determines the cycle. 
The underwriting cycle is normally analyzed by studying the dynamics of the loss or combined ratio 
(the ratio of respectively claims paid and claims plus expenses to premiums collected).  The 
inversion of the production cycle typical of the insurance industry plays a key role in shaping 
profitability dynamics. The seminal model is the one proposed by Venezian (1985), which 
concludes that cycles are created by how insurers set prices. Studying the US industry, he posits 
that insurers set prices based on a naïve extrapolation, as past claim costs are used to project 
future ones. Typically, he found that the last three years of data for claims are used to project them 
to up to two years into the future, and then premiums are set according to this forecast: this in itself  
is enough to generate cyclical patterns (of around six years of length) for the combined ratio.  
Cummins and Outreville (1987), refine this model, laying the foundation for the most widely used 
specification. They set up a rational expectation pricing model and show that, even if insurers can 
optimally forecast future claims, specific contract features, reporting lags, delayed data availability 
and staggered contracts generate frictions which are fully responsible for the cycle. They find that 
the best approximation for the dynamics is an AR(2) model and derive the following empirical 
specification, estimated with annual data. 
𝐿𝑅𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑅𝑡−2 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡  (1) 
 
Where  LR is the loss ratio and D a set of time dummies. Moreover the existence of a cycle 
requires the following restrictions on the coefficients 
𝛽1 > 0, 𝛽2 < 0, 𝛽1
2 + 4𝛽2 
And the length of the cycle is calculated as 𝑃 = 2𝜋/𝑐𝑜𝑠−1 (
𝛽1
2√−𝛽2
) 
This specification has been widely used to study the behavior of different line of business in one 
market and across countries (see for example Meier (2006) or Meier e Outreville (2010)). This type 
of literature find strong evidence for the AR(2) specification and cycle length varying between 4.5 
and 7 years, depending on countries and lines of business.  
This model is further developed by Lamm-Tennant and Weiss (1997), which suggest a slightly 
more sophisticated specification capable of better accommodating country or line of business-
specific features. Moreover, and most importantly, they model premium growth rather than the loss 
or the combined ratio, allowing for more flexibility in the response of premiums to past claim 
evolution. They estimate the following model: 
∆𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝛽𝑞∆𝑃𝑖𝑡−𝑞 + ∑ 𝛾𝑞𝑋𝑡−𝑛 +
𝑁
𝑛=1
𝑄
𝑞=1 ∑ 𝛿𝑚𝐷𝑡−𝑚 +
𝑀
𝑚=0 𝜀𝑡 (2) 
 
Where the vector X contains macroeconomic variables and lagged measures of claims growth or 
insurance profitability.  
This model too has been extensively used to analyses premium evolution over time and for 
different lines of business and to measure the length of the underwriting cycle35. 
 
                                               
35
 For example Chen, et al. (1999) apply the methods proposed by Cummins and Outreville  (1987) and 
Lamm-Tennant and Weiss (1997) to several Asian and European countries, finding evidence for the validity 
of both type of modelling. 
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However this somehow mechanistic approach to the cycle has attracted criticism. Boyer, Jacquier 
and Van Der Noorden (2012) perform a througut testing of the AR(2) specification applied to US 
data, finding that parameters are estimated very imprecisingly and that this type of model has a 
poor forecasting performance, and eventually argue against the existence of fixed length and 
measurable cycles. This point is further stressed by Boyer and Owadally (2015). After a meta 
analysis of the papers on the subject publshed over the last 30 years they conclude that “the 
evidence supporting the existence of underwriting cycles is misleading” and therefore argiung that 
insurance profitability cannot be predicted using standard econometric tools. Their criticism is the 
starting point of this paper, which however uses a standard econometric setting to improve the 
forecasting performance of the AR(2) specification.    
Recently, Bruneau e Sghaier (2015) have recovered the AR(2) model using a more sophisticated 
econometric setting and aggregate data on the French Property and Casualty industry between 
1963 to 2008. They show that the standard AR(2) specification works when capacity, defined as 
the ratio between financial capital to premium, is low, while when capital constraints are not binding 
the combined ratio is found to be related to lagged stock market. Moreover, capitalization is related 
to past inflation. They conclude that this evidence points to the need for solvency rules to take into 
account of the financial cycle when setting the capital requirements. 
A few papers have tackled the issues of the long term relationships among insurance and financial 
variables. The most detailed application (and closest in spirit to the analysis presented below) is 
the one by Lazar and Denuit (2011). They consider the aggregate US Property and Liability sector 
and, using different econometric techniques, document that premiums have a positive long run 
relationship with losses and GDP and a negative one with short-term real interest rates. Looking at 
several developed economies, Bruneau et al.(2009) found long term relationships and strong 
evidence of nonlinearity in the adjustment to equilibrium between non-life premiums and financial 
variables: in particular, they found a positive relationship with the stock exchange and a negative 
one with short term interest rates. 
The last two papers uncover statistical facts and in the latter case, relate them to financial pricing 
models but do not seek to provide any explanation on the linkages between the business and 
underwriting cycle. Importantly, no structural explanation is provided for the positive relationship 
between the business cycle and premium dynamics. 
 3. MODELLING CLAIMS AND PREMIUMS TOGETHER 
 
This paper attempts to reproduce with time series econometric tools what non-life actuaries 
routinely do in order to price contracts: getting an estimate of the costs the company is expected to 
incur over the duration of the contract and set its price accordingly. Therefore, I first derive a 
forecast for claims, based on macroeconomic variables and then relate it to premiums using a 
simple pricing model. 
I use aggregate 1976 to 2015 annual data for the Italian MTPL line of business, for which series on 
claims frequency and the average cost of claims are available. They are related to overall losses 
by the following identity 
𝐿𝑂𝑡 = 𝐹𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝐴𝐶𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑇𝑂𝐶𝐾𝑡 
With LO, total losses paid to claimholders, FR claims frequency, AC average costs and STOCK the 
number of insured vehicles.  
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On the claim side, when individual data are available frequency and severity are generally 
modelled jointly using information such as age, gender, type of car, etc.,. with cross section 
models. Count data or logistic specifications normally employed36. Of course these models are of 
little use in estimate the aggregate behavior over time, and in the specification I simply assume 
that  
- The probability of having an accident (frequency) is related to on how intensively vehicle 
are used, which is in turn a function of economic activity and the cost of fuel. I also consider 
the technological improvement in vehicles which has increased their safety.  Moreover, 
driving behavior is also influenced by rules and therefore I take into accounts the evolution 
of traffic laws. 
- The severity is assumed to be a function of the labor costs in the repairing sectors and of 
the quality of the stock of vehicles, with a larger share of newer ones leading to higher 
costs. Admittedly the choice of variables does not consider bodily injuries. During the period 
considered, their costs were by and large decided in courts, with large differences across 
provinces. However, the overall good fit of the model shows that the covariates chosen are 
sufficient.  I consider also the evolution of the traffic laws. 
- For premiums, I consider as regressors the evolution of claims and the short term interest 
rate. This choice is motivated by several theories of non-life insurance premiums: from the 
simplest one, in which premiums reflect the discounted value of expected losses, plus 
expenses and a risk premium, to the extension of the CAPM model to the non-life 
insurance business, first introduced by Cooper (1974), described below37.  
Premiums for period t are collected in t-1 and pays for losses at t (whose amount is clearly not 
known at t-1). Insurer’s net income (Y) is the sum of underwriting income (U), derived from the 
insurance activity, investment income (I) derived from investing premiums between collection and 
claims payment. We have then 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝑈𝑡 + 𝐼𝑡                (1) 
Underwriting income is the difference between premiums earned38 (P), losses (L) and expenses 
(S). Assuming that administrative expenses and commissions to intermediaries (s) are proportional 
to premiums we have. 
𝑈𝑡 = 𝑃𝑡 − 𝐿𝑡 − 𝑆𝑡 = (1 − 𝑠)𝑃𝑡 − 𝐿𝑡         (2) 
This can be redefined as 
𝑈𝑡 = 𝑟𝑡
𝑈𝑃𝑡  , 𝑟𝑡
𝑈 ≡
𝑈𝑡
𝑃𝑡
=
[(1−𝑠)𝑃𝑡−𝐿𝑡]
𝑃𝑡
         (3)  
Where 𝑟𝑡
𝑈 is the underwriting return. 
Total return, which equals the return on equity, is then 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝑈𝑡 + 𝐼𝑡 = 𝑟𝑡
𝑈𝑃𝑡 + 𝑟𝑡
𝐴𝐴𝑡 = 𝑟𝑡
𝐸𝐸𝑡     (4) 
Where A is total asset rA return on asset, rE the return on equity and E equity 
                                               
36
 See, for example Yip e Kelvin (2005) on frequency and Ayuso et al. (2007) on severity. 
37
 See also Cummins and Phillips (2000) and Hun Seog (2010), chapter 15. 
38
 I abstract here from reinsurance activity, which plays a minor role in motor lines 
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Using the balance sheet identity At = Rt + Et, and under the simplifying assumption that insurers’ 
liability are just composed of loss reserves and equity39, (4) can be solved for the return on equity 
to get  
𝑟𝑡
𝐸 = 𝑟𝑡
𝑈 𝑃𝑡
𝐸𝑡
+ 𝑟𝑡
𝐴 (
𝑃𝑡
𝐸𝑡
𝑅
𝑃𝑡
+ 1) (5) 
Using the CAPM formula and taking expectations, the returns on equity and assets can also be 
written as 
𝐸𝑟𝑡
𝐸 = 𝑟𝑡
𝑓 + 𝛽𝐸(𝐸𝑟𝑀 − 𝑟𝑡
𝑓
)    (6) 
𝐸𝑟𝑡
𝐴 = 𝑟𝑡
𝑓 + 𝛽𝐴(𝐸𝑟𝑀 − 𝑟𝑡
𝑓
)    (7) 
Combining (5), (6) and (7), and solving for the expected underwriting return I get  
𝐸𝑟𝑡
𝑈 = −
𝑃𝑡
𝐸𝑡
𝑟𝑡
𝑓 + 𝛽𝑈(𝐸𝑟𝑀 − 𝑟𝑡
𝑓
) (8) 
From the definition of underwriting return shown in (3), taking expectations and assuming that the 
underwriting risk premium 𝛽𝑈(𝐸𝑟𝑀 − 𝑟𝑡
𝑓
) is constant and equal to B I get an equilibrium relationship 
for the level of premiums. 
𝑃𝑡 =
𝐸𝐿𝑡
[(1−𝑠)+𝑟𝑡
𝑓
−𝐵]
 (9) 
Therefore this simple model posits a positive relationship between premium and expected losses 
and a negative one with the risk free rate.  
Of course, there are shortcomings in both the theoretical model and the application.   
- First of all the model shares all the known limitations of the standard CAPM, but as 
suggested by Cummins and Phillips (2000) the extension to multi-factor models should be 
straightforward. This is left for future research.  
- Secondly, the Insurance CAPM is a one-period model, and in principle it is not suitable for 
long-term insurance contracts: however, given that MTPL contracts are by law annual this 
is probably a minor nuisance in the present context.  
- Additionally, theoretical and empirical analysis have shown that default risk, and more 
broadly capitalization can play an important role in pricing (see for example, Cummins and 
Danzon, 1997), and CAPM pricing does not take into account these factors. However, the 
impact of capitalisation on pricing is more likely to be seen when considering individual 
firms, due to idiosycratic choices in terms of market positioning and pricing and overall 
efficiency. The overall level of capitlisation is (should be) kept in check by regulation and 
should not affect average prices.   
- A more damaging (at least theoretically) objection is that while CAPM assumes that assets 
are tradable (Hun Seog 2010, chp. 15), while  motor insurance liabilities are mottly not 
tradable given the limited use of reinsurance.   
However all these objections must be weighted against the intuitive nature of the model and its 
ability to fit the data relatively well. 
                                               
39
 Debt issuance is very limited in non-life insurers, and normally used just for M&A activity. 
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Based on the observation of actual ratemaking, I assume that insurers have partially adaptive 
expectations, i.e. they set prices based on average between the expected level of claims in the 
current and next year and on what happened in the previous one, as they try to smooth out large 
fluctuations in claims (due, for example of particularly bad weather) in order not to have too much 
volatility in premiums. In the empirical application I set as expected claims their average40. 
Therefore expectations are, at least partially rational (model consistent) in the spirit of Cummins 
and Outreville (1987). 
During the period I consider, the Italian motor insurance market went to some regulatory reforms 
which affected pricing ad need to be considered in the empirical model. They are summarized in 
the following section, along the changes in the traffic laws. 
4. KEY REFORMS TO TRAFFIC LAWS AND MTPL INSURANCE REGULATION 
 
Motor Third Party Liability (MTPL) insurance, is not only the largest non-life line in Italy accounting 
for over 40% of total non-life premiums, but also, being this cover mandatory, the most heavily 
regulated. Moreover, claim dynamics is clearly affected by the impact of the road safety legislation. 
The most important are the following: 
 Price liberalization. In 1994 the system of state planned rates for MTPL was dismantled 
following the EU Single Market Directive.  
 Reforms to the traffic laws (“Codice della Strada”) enacted in 1992 and 2001,  with the most 
important provisions coming into force over the following years, including 
o Stricter speed limits (1992) and steeper penalties for drunk driving 
o Change in penalty system (2001). A new system penalty system for traffic offence 
was introduced. Each driver receives twenty “points”, which are lost in case of 
offences. If all points are lost the license is revoked. 
o Mandatory installation of ABS on all new vehicles (2001) 
 Direct compensation (2007): in case of damages to the vehicles and small bodily injuries, 
the claimant is refunded by the company with which she is insured. This company will in 
turn receive from the one covering the responsible of the accident a fixed reimbursement, 
based on the historical average cost of claims. The measure is aimed at controlling claim 
costs and speeding up and simplifying settlement. 
 Change in the “Bonus malus”41 system (2007). Each driver is allocated to a class according 
to its past claims history: after two year without accident she moves to a lower risk class. 
From 2008 on all persons living in the same household were allowed take the class of its 
less risky member, with a corresponding decline in premium paid (for example a driver in 
their 20s took the risk class of her parents). This led to a large migration of drivers into the 
two lowest risk classes and a corresponding fall in premiums. However, as premiums no 
longer reflected the true risk, the deterioration in technical results led to a repricing over the 
following two years.  
Figure 1 plots claims frequency, the average cost and two measures of the underwriting cycle, the 
loss ratio (total compensations as share of premiums) and the growth rate of premiums alongside 
the time of the key reforms. 
                                               
40
 The use of lagged value of losses tries also to account for incurred but not reported claims, which can be 
paid years after they have been sustained. 
41
 No fault 
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5. MODEL STRUCTURE, DATA, AND ESTIMATION METHOD 
 
In order to model premiums and losses I employ a standard simultaneous equations approach, 
whose use is widespread in macroeconomics but has enjoyed only a limited popularity in finance42 
The empirical model used for the simulations consists of three estimated equations and an identity 
(see table 7 for a detailed representation of the model and the alternative ones used in the forecast 
comparison): 
- An equation for claims frequency: here I relate frequency to economic activity (real GDP) as 
a proxy for car usage, its cost (the real price of fuels43), a linear trend, capturing 
technological progress increasing vehicle security and ( just possibly) better driving skills. 
The 1992 and 2001 traffic law reforms are considered in the form of two step dummies. 
Only the latter is statistically significant. 
- An equation for the average cost of claims (deflated by CPI). Ideally one would model 
separately bodily injuries and vehicle damages as the former are often compensated after a 
court sentence; in the period considered each court (and sometimes judge) had its own 
way to assess the extent of the compensation. However, the breakdown is available only 
from 2000. I take real wages as a proxy for the gauge used to settle bodily injuries 
compensation and the labor costs needed for repairing and a proxy for the average quality 
of the vehicle stock, constructed as the share of vehicles less than four year old in the total, 
under the implicit assumption that newer cars are more costly to repair44.  I also consider 
the dummies for the 2001 traffic laws reforms and for the 2007 introduction of direct 
compensation. Based on the results of the AIC tests, I retained a model with a just linear 
trend. 
- An equation for premiums (expressed in real terms and divided by the stock of vehicles), as 
a function of the yield on 3-month government bonds and the moving average of total 
losses (real, per vehicle). In the short term equation I added the output gap, to test the 
cyclical properties of the markup45. 
- An identity relating total claims (L) with frequency (FR), average cost (AC) and the stock of 
vehicles in circulation (VE) treated as exogenous46. 
  
As an initial step the order of integration of the insurance variables is established using a standard 
Augmented Dickey Fuller test, allowing for a break. The results (shown in Appendix A) point to all 
processes being I(1), with some less clear cut results for frequency especially when a specification 
including a linear trend is considered.  
                                               
42
 See Dreger and Marcellino (2007) for a macroeconomic example, Casolaro and Gambacorta (2004) for a 
model of the Italian banking system and Cummins (1973) for an early application of simultaneous equations 
models to life insurance. 
43
 Computed as the price of gasoline and diesel fuel, weighted by consumption 
44
 Price indexes for spare parts and car repair are available only from 1999. 
45
 The relationship between demand fluctuations and oligopoly was first explored theoretically by (Rotheberg 
& Saloner, 1986). For a macroeconomic angle on the relationship between the business cycle and price 
markups see, for example Galí, Gertler, & López-Salido (2000), Blanchard (2008) and Nekarda and Ramey 
(2013). 
46
 A simple model, relating macroeconomic variables to vehicle registrations and cancellations, thus capable 
to project the size of the stock can be easily appended, but it is not the focus of this paper. 
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Given the evidence of nonstationary in the insurance variables, the model consists of a set of three 
equations specified as error correction models, in which short term fluctuation depend also (and 
crucially) on the deviation of the past value of the dependent variables from its equilibrium value. 
Therefore I look for long term relationship between the variables. There are several possible 
options for testing for their existence and modelling them. I chose the methodology developed by 
Pesaran et al. (2001). I prefer it over others for several reasons:  
- Monte Carlo simulations have shown that it delivers more reliable results in terms of 
exsitence of cointegrating vectors whan the sample is short (Haug, 2002). However, as 
a robustness check, I consider also the result of a Dynamic OLS estimation (Stock e 
Watson, 1993). 
- It does not restrict all the series to be I(1) and this is relevant given the mixed evidence 
on claims frequency 
- It allows some flexiblity in the choice of the lag structure of the dependent variable and 
the covariates (as opposed to the Johansen-Joselius VAR methodology or Stock and 
Watson’s DOLS) 
Finally, once the existence of long term relationships is established, a standard ECM specification 
is estimated separatedly for each variable in order to assess the model properties. Finally,  the 
three equations are estimated jointly with standard three step least squares to produce the model. 
5.1 LONG TERM RELATIONSHIPS 
 
Tables 1 to 3 present the results of the ARDL estimation: the long term coefficients47 for the 
covariates and the results of the bound tests and the coefficient on the error correction term which 
measures the speed of the adjustment toward the equilibrium after a shock. The asymptotic critical 
values are provided alongside the finite sample ones proposed by Narayan (2004). The F-statistic 
is well above the I(1) bound indicating that the hypothesis of no long run relationship is strongly 
rejected. Moreover, the signs of the covariate are in line with expectations. 
As a robustness check I estimate the same models using Stock and Watson (1993) Dynamic OLS, 
and test for cointegration using the Engle and Granger and Philips and Oularis tests. The results, 
shown in Appendix B, confirm the evidence of the expected long run relationships. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
47
 Note that the coefficients for static regressors (like to step or level dummies introduced to account for 
legislative reforms) are not computed. They are duly introduced in the short term specification.  
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     TABLE 1: Long run relationship 
Dependent variable: claim frequency 
Sample 1976 – 2015 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
     Real fuel prices (log) -0.019 0.008 -2.349 0.026 
Real GDP (log)  0.090 0.021 4.197  0.000 
Linear Trend -0.001 0.000 -3.025 0.005 
     
     Serial Correlation: 0.003 [0.99]  Heteroskedasticity: 1.220 [0.323] 
 
Cointegrating vector 
EC = FR_RCA - (-0.019*LOG(RPCARB) + 0.090*LOG(GDPR) -0.001*t) 
 
     
          
F-Bounds Test Null Hypothesis: No levels relationship 
     
     Test Statistic Value Signif. I(0) I(1) 
     
  Asymptotic: n=1000 
F-statistic  8.637513 5%   3.88 4.61 
K 2 1%   4.99 5.85 
  Finite Sample: n=40 
Actual Sample Size 40 5%   4.36 4.61 
  1%   5.98 6.973 
     
     
 
     
     TABLE 2: Long run relationship 
Dependent variable: Average cost of claims (deflated with CPI) 
Sample 1976 – 2015 
     
     
Variable 
Coefficie
nt Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
     Real wages  (log) 1.705 0.839 2.031  0.053 
% of <4 year old cars  0.061 0.018 3.278  0.090 
Linear Trend 0.076 0.031 2.441  0.022 
     
     Serial Correlation: 1.206 [0.314]  Heteroskedasticity: 1.229 [0.290] 
 
Cointegrating vector 
EC = Log(RAC) - (1.705*LOG(RWAGE) + 0.061*LOG(%NEWC) -0.076*t) 
 
     
          
F-Bounds Test Null Hypothesis: No levels relationship 
     
     Test Statistic Value Signif. I(0) I(1) 
     
       Asymptotic: n=1000 
F-statistic  6.400 5%   3.88 4.61 
  1%   4.99 5.85 
     
K 2    
     
  Finite Sample: n=40 
Actual Sample Size 40 5%   4.36 4.61 
  1%   5.98 6.973 
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TABLE 3: Long run relationship 
Dependent variable: Average real unt premiums  
Sample 1976 – 2015 
     
     Variable Coeff. Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
     T-Bill Rate -0.026 0.007 -3.389  0.002 
ClaimsAverage   0.873 0.055 15.872  0.000 
Constant -0.027 0.051 -0.526  0.603 
     
     Serial Correlation: 1.214 [0.313]  Heteroskedasticity: 1.430 [0. 232] 
 
Cointegrating vector 
EC = Log(RUPR) - (--0.026*TBOT + 0.873*LOG(RUCL) -0.027) 
 
     
          
F-Bounds Test Null Hypothesis: No levels relationship 
     
     Test Statistic Value Signif. I(0) I(1) 
     
     
   
Asymptotic: 
n=1000  
F-statistic  4.96437 5%   3.1 3.87 
K  1%   4.13 5.00 
     
Actual Sample Size 40  
Finite 
Sample: 
n=40  
  5%   3.435 4.26 
  1%   4.77 5.855 
     
     
 
5.2 SHORT TERM DYNAMICS 
 
The three equations do not have endogenous regressors, as the business cycle and interest rate 
are not affected by the dynamics of the motor insurance market, so the short term dynamics can 
be estimated simply via OLS applied to individual equations. However, for robustness system 
3SLS estimation is performed too and the results (which are not markedly different from the OLS 
ones) are used to build the simulation model. 
Tables 4 to 6 present the results and some specification tests. A few comments are in order. Firstly 
the error correction terms are in all the three cases correctly signed and statistically significant, 
adding to the evidence of the cointegration analysis: however their magnitude is rather low, 
indicating quite a slow return to equilibrium after a shock. The strength of the short term impact of 
the covariates varies across equations. It appears quite strong in the frequency equation and much 
less so in the claim equation. Tighter traffic laws seem to have played a role in reducing both 
claims frequency and severity and direct compensation contributed to lower claim costs. The 
premiums equation has some interesting features. First of all, the specification tests lead to an 
AR(3) structure, indicating, together with the relatively low value of the coefficient associated to the 
error correction term, a rather high level of persistence in the series. Moreover, premiums are 
shown to adapt quite quickly to changes in claims growth and there is an evidence of procyclical 
markup over compensation costs. Finally, the 2007 reform of the way MTPL contracts are priced 
was effective in lowering premiums.   
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     TABLE 4: Short Term relationship 
Dependent Variable: Claim frequency (annual change) D_FR  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 08/07/17   Time: 16:43  
Sample (adjusted): 1977 2015  
Included observations: 39 after adjustments 
HAC std. errors & covariance  
     
     Variable Coeff Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     
     Constant -6.343 2.136 -2.969 0.006 
Change in frequency (-1) 0.238 0.122 1.952 0.061 
Fuel price growth -0.013 0.005 -2.309 0.029 
Real GDP growth 0.139 0.043 3.254 0.003 
Error Correction term (-1) -0.217 0.075 -2.910 0.007 
Traffic laws dummy -1.667 0.368 -4.534 0.000 
2009 dummy 0.823 0.370 2.223 0.035 
     
     Adjusted R-squared 0.718     Mean dependent var -0.259 
S.E. of regression 0.340     S.D. dependent var 0.489 
F-statistic 7.092     Durbin-Watson stat 2.128 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000     RESET[1] p-val. 0.652 
Serial correlation, p-val. 0.217     Hetersch., p-val 0.965198 
     
     TABLE 5: Short Term relationship 
Dependent Variable: Average cost (annual % change)   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample (adjusted): 1977 2015  
Included observations: 38 after adjustments 
HAC std errors & covariance  
     
     Variable Coeff Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     
     Constant 0.106 0.031 3.441 0.002 
Avg. Cost growth(-1)) 0.424 0.168 2.531 0.018 
Avg. Cost growth -2)) 0.182 0.105 1.740 0.094 
D(% of <4 year old vehcles) 0.545 0.281 1.942 0.064 
Error correction term -0.058 0.029 -2.008 0.056 
2001 Traffic laws dummy -0.043 0.014 -2.982 0.006 
Direct Refund dummy -0.053 0.007 -7.195 0.000 
 - . . 
     Adjusted R-squared 0.737     Mean dependent var 0.066 
S.E. of regression 0.0260     S.D. dependent var 0.050 
F-statistic 15.479     Durbin-Watson stat 1.714 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000     RESET[1] p-val. 0.091 
Serial correlation, p-val. 0.280     Heterosch., p-val 0.324 
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TABLE 6: Short Term relationship 
Dependent Variable: Real premiums per vehicle (% growth)   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample (adjusted): 1977 2015  
Included observations: 38 after adjustments 
HAC std errors & covariance  
     
     Variable Coeff Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     
     Real premium growth(-1) 0.376 0.169 2.223 0.035 
Real premium growth(-2) 0.131 0.115 1.148 0.261 
Real premium growth(-3) -0.159 0.084 -1.906 0.067 
Real  claims growth 0.440 0.153 2.884 0.008 
D(T-bill rate) -0.005 0.002 -1.992 0.057 
Output Gap 0.005 0.002 2.065 0.049 
Error Correction Term(-1) -0.266 0.082 -3.244 0.045 
Insurance reform dummy -0.047 0.006 -7.241 0.000 
 -    
     Adjusted R-squared 0.878     Mean dependent var 0.041 
S.E. of regression 0.022     S.D. dependent var 0.062 
Serial correlation, p-val      Durbin-Watson stat    2.135 
Heterosch., p-val      RESET[1] p-val. 0.732 
     
      
5. FORECASTING PERFORMANCE 
 
Once the statistical properties of the model are assessed, it is possible to answer to the key 
question of the paper, i.e. whether modelling explicitly losses leads to a better forecasting of 
premium dynamics and profitability. I evaluate the model presented above based on its capability 
to forecast premium growth and the loss ratio one to three year ahead. To this end I estimate it and 
the alternative ones first between 1976 to 2008 and produce an out of sample forecast, then I add 
one year and repeat the process. 
As far as premium growth is concerned I compare the prediction of the structural model with:  
 
1) The structural model, estimated without considering the log term relationship: Clements and 
Hendry (1995) have shown that a bad speficiation of the long term relationship may lead to 
less accurated forecasts compared with a simple model in differences. 
2) A single equation model for premium growth based on Lamm-Tennant and Weiss (1997), 
i.e. a AR(2) model with added regressors like the short term rate the output gap, lagged 
values of the loss ratio and the dummies for the legislative reforms. At any date the added 
regressors and their lags are chosen as to minimize RMSE.  
3) A single equation AR(2) model for the loss ratio, augmented by the dummy for the 
insurance market and traffic laws reforms. 
Table 7 summarizes the  models I compare. 
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TABLE 7: forecasting models 
Model A: Structural model with long term relationships 
 
𝐷(𝐹𝑅𝑡) = 𝛼
1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖
11𝐷(𝐹𝑅𝑡−𝑖) + ∑ 𝛽𝑗
12𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑅𝑡−𝑗) + ∑ 𝛽𝑝
13𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑔(
𝑃
𝑝=0
𝑅𝑃𝐹𝑡−𝑝) + 𝛿
1(𝐹𝑅𝑡−1 − 𝐹𝑅𝑡−1
∗
𝐽
𝑗=0
) + 𝜃1𝐷𝑡
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐
𝐼
𝑖=1
 
 
𝐷𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐴𝐶𝑡/𝑃𝑡) = 𝛼
2
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑖
21𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐴𝐶𝑡−𝑖/𝑃𝑡−𝑖) +
𝐼
𝑖=1
∑ 𝛽𝑗
22𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐿𝐶𝑡−𝑖/𝑃𝑡−𝑖) +
𝐽
𝑗=0
∑ 𝛽𝑖
23𝑑(𝑉𝑄𝑡−𝑖)
𝐼
𝑖=0
+ 𝛿2(𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐴𝐶𝑡−1/𝑃𝑡−1) − log (𝐴𝐶𝑡−1/𝑃𝑡−1)
∗)) + 𝜃2𝐷𝑡
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐
 
 
𝐷𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑃𝑅𝑡 𝑃𝑡⁄
𝑆𝑇𝑂𝐶𝐾𝑡
) = 𝛼3
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑖
31𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑃𝑅𝑡−𝑖 𝑃𝑡−𝑖⁄
𝑆𝑇𝑂𝐶𝐾𝑡−𝑖
)   +
𝐼
𝑖=1
∑ 𝛽𝑖
32𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝐿𝑂𝑡−𝑖 𝑃𝑡−𝑖⁄
𝑆𝑇𝑂𝐶𝐾𝑡−𝑖
) +
𝐼
𝑖=−1
∑ 𝛽𝑖
33𝑑(𝑇𝐵3𝑡−𝑖) + ∑ 𝛽
34𝑌𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑡−𝑞
𝑄
𝑞=0
 
𝐼
𝑖=0
+ 𝛿3 (𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑃𝑅𝑡−1 𝑃𝑡−1⁄
𝑆𝑇𝑂𝐶𝐾𝑡−1
) − (
𝑃𝑅𝑡−1 𝑃𝑡−1⁄
𝑆𝑇𝑂𝐶𝐾𝑡−1
)
∗
) + 𝜃3𝐷𝑡
𝐼𝑛𝑠 
 
𝐿𝑂𝑡 = 𝐹𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝐴𝐶𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑇𝑂𝐶𝐾𝑡 
𝐿𝑅𝑡 = 100 ∗
𝐿𝑂
𝑃𝑅
 
“*”Indicates the long term value of the variable, given by the cointegrating vector 
Model B: Structural model with no long term relationships 
 
𝐷(𝐹𝑅) = 𝛼1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖
11𝐷(𝐹𝑅𝑡−𝑖) + ∑ 𝛽𝑗
12𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑅𝑡−𝑗) + ∑ 𝛽𝑝
13𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑔(
𝑃
𝑝=0
𝑅𝑃𝐹𝑡−𝑝) +
𝐽
𝑗=0
𝜃1𝐷𝑡
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐
𝐼
𝑖=1
 
 
𝐷𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐴𝐶/𝑃) = 𝛼2 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖
21𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐴𝐶𝑡−𝑖/𝑃𝑡−𝑖) +
𝐼
𝑖=1
∑ 𝛽𝑗
22𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐿𝐶𝑡−𝑖/𝑃𝑡−𝑖) +
𝐽
𝑗=0
∑ 𝛽𝑖
23𝑑(𝑉𝑄𝑡−𝑖)
𝐼
𝑖=0
+ 𝜃2𝐷𝑡
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐
 
 
𝐷𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑃𝑅𝑡 𝑃𝑡⁄
𝑆𝑇𝑂𝐶𝐾𝑡
) = 𝛼3 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖
31𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑃𝑅𝑡−𝑖 𝑃𝑡−𝑖⁄
𝑆𝑇𝑂𝐶𝐾𝑡−𝑖
)  +
𝐼
𝑖=1
∑ 𝛽𝑖
32𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝐿𝑂𝑡−𝑖 𝑃𝑡−𝑖⁄
𝑆𝑇𝑂𝐶𝐾𝑡−𝑖
) +
𝐼
𝑖=−1
∑ 𝛽𝑖
33𝑑(𝑇𝐵3𝑡−𝑖) + ∑ 𝛽
34𝑌𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑡−𝑞
𝑄
𝑞=0
 
𝐼
𝑖=0
+ 𝜃3𝐷𝑡
𝐼𝑛𝑠 
 
𝐿𝑂𝑡 = 𝐹𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝐴𝐶𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑇𝑂𝐶𝐾𝑡 
𝐿𝑅𝑡 = 100 ∗
𝐿𝑂
𝑃𝑅
 
 
Model C: Lamm-Tennant (1997) 
𝐷𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑃𝑅𝑡 𝑃𝑡⁄
𝑆𝑇𝑂𝐶𝐾𝑡
) = 𝛼𝑃𝑅 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖
𝑃𝑅𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑃𝑅𝑡−𝑖 𝑃𝑡−𝑖⁄
𝑆𝑇𝑂𝐶𝐾𝑡−𝑖
)  +
𝐼
𝑖=1
∑ 𝛽𝑖
𝐿𝑂𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑅𝑡−𝑖) +
𝐼
𝑖=0
∑ 𝛽𝑖
𝑇𝐵𝑑(𝑇𝐵3𝑡−𝑖) + ∑ 𝜃𝑞
𝐿𝑅
𝐿𝑂𝑡−𝑞
𝑃𝑅𝑡−𝑞
𝑄
𝑞=1
 
𝐼
𝑖=0
+ 𝜃𝑇𝑅𝐷𝑡
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐
+ 𝜃𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑡
𝐼𝑛𝑠 
Model D: AR(2) for the Loss Ratio 
𝐿𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼
𝐿𝑅+ ∑ 𝜌𝑖
2
𝑖=1
𝐿𝑅𝑡−𝑖 + +𝜃
𝑇𝑅𝐷𝑡
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐
+ 𝜃𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑡
𝐼𝑛𝑠 
Insurance market variables: 
FR: claims Frequency, AC: average cost of claims, PR: MTPL premiums, LO: total claims expenditure, LR: Loss Ratio 
Macroeconomic/Financial Variables:  
GDPR: Real GDP, RPF: fuel prices deflated by CPI, P: CPI , VQ: share of less than 4our year old cars in the total (proxy for vehicle 
quality)  , STOCK: registered vehicles, TB3: yield on 3 month government bills, YGAP: Output gap 
Dummies: 
DTraffic: dummies for the 1992 and 2001 traffic law reforms. DIns: Step dummies for the 2007 direct remburement regulation and the 
2008 Bonus malus reform 
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Tables 8 and 9 compare the 1 to 3 year ahead forecasts for the premium level and the loss 
ratio. Given the relatively short sample I measure the performance using simple metrics 
like RMSE or Theil’s Us, as other metods like the Diebold and Mariano’s one are too data 
intensive.  
Table 8: forecast comparison for premium levels 
The numbers in bold indicate the best performance according to the measure 
1-year ahead 
 RMSE MAE MAPE SMAPE Theil U1 Theil U2 
Baseline 586189.9 436361.3 2.611 2.566 0.018 0.628 
In difference 530422.8 488855.7 2.939 2.935 0.016 0.584 
AR(2) 685722.4 607267.1 3.610 3.595 0.021 0.805 
2-year ahead 
Baseline 1043428 878705.7 5.500 5.319 0.030 1.240 
In difference 996896.9 948557 5.821 5.835 0.031 1.210 
AR(2) 1741983 1462634 8.794 8.652 0.053 1.995 
3-year ahead 
Baseline 1685560 1264462 8.274 7.802 0.051 2.066 
In difference 1469476 1264579 7.736 7.833 0.046 1.684 
AR(2) 2617916 2311133 14.573 14.101 0.079 2.981 
 
Table 9: forecast comparison for the loss ratio 
The numbers in bold indicate the best performance according to the measure 
1-year ahead 
 RMSE MAE MAPE SMAPE Theil U1 Theil U2 
Baseline 3.423 2.435 3.043 2.964 0.021 0.784 
In difference 3.432 2.767 3.382 3.317 0.021 0.782 
AR(2) 4.434 3.190 3.963 3.850 0.028 1.004 
2-year ahead 
Baseline 5.241 3.909 5.018 4.842 0.033 1.319 
In difference 5.119 4.023 5.221 5.119 0.032 1.314 
AR(2) 8.402 6.839 8.687 8.299 0.052 2.017 
3-year ahead 
Baseline 7.331 6.686 8.924 8.516 0.046 1.907 
In difference 11.038 10.502 14.011 13.074 0.068 2.962 
AR(2) 12.651 10.348 13.828 12.612 0.078 3.247 
RMSE: Root Mean Squared Error, 
MAE: Mean Absolute Error,  
MAPE: Mean Absolute Percentagne Error,  
SMAPE: Synthetic Mean Absolute Percentagne Error 
  
A full model with premiums and claims responding to macro variable is superior to a model 
with just premiums, while the evidence of the usefulness of the long term relationship is 
less clear cut. What stands out is that including a projection of current and one step ahead 
losses in the equation for premium, growth improves the forecasting performance. 
Figure 2 compares the forecasts for the Loss ratio at different horizons, showing how the 
structural model is better capable of spotting the turning points in profitability. 
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Figure 2: Loss ratio forecasts 
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6. DISCUSSION 
 
The model just shown can be used to forecast the evolution of premiums and of 
profitability given a set of macroeconomic projections and to conduct simple scenario 
analyses on how fast the motor insurance market reacts to shocks. For example, Figure 3 
shows the impact of a 10 percent permament and unanticipated decrease in average 
claims costs, highlighting  a relatively slow path of premium adjustement. 
Figure 3: impact of a 10% permanent decrease in average costs 
 
 
 Of course this modelling framework is not exempt from drawbacks.   
The use of aggregate data may hamper the identification of important factors such as the 
ongoing change in the market structure, as it is likely that, for example concentration 
affects the  premium markup. The same applies to distribution channels, as far as the 
impact of online sales is concerned. 
Another possible improvement in the model, which was prevented in this paper by the 
absence of data, could be to consied also stock variables (like insurance provisions and  
capital)  in the model. Bruneau, et al. (2009) show that, for the French non-life sector as a 
whole, the loss ratio has  a stable relationship with the degree of capitalization in the 
industry. This could be very useful to assess the impact of very large shocks and, in line 
with what proposed by Bruneau and Sghaier (2015), to integrate macroeconomic 
conditions into the asessment of capital requirements, using a framework with a detialed 
description of how shocks are transmitted from the technical account to the balance sheet. 
The absence of good long term series on administrative expenses and commissions 
prevented the modelling of the combined ratio, which is in principle straightforward, as a 
long term relationship between these expenses and wages/prices is likely. This could be 
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useful for assesing to what extent and at which hspeed changes in non-claims related 
expenses are passed through to consumers. In principle the model could be further 
expanded to arrive to a full fledged model of the technical accounts of a specific line of 
business. This modelling approach appears particularly suitable for line of business that 
are higly responsive to the business cycle, like motor. A useful extension would be to other 
quantitatively important lines like home insurance.  
This framework could be applied on company data, resultin in an important tool for 
planning and stress tests. At the same time this approach could be used by insurance and 
competition regulators to monitor and project profitability and overall soundness of different 
non life lines of business. 
In terms of model specification, another important issue would be to use the cointegration 
framework to assess to  what exent the adjustment of premium to losses is nonlinear48 or 
asymmetric, i.e. whether premiums converge to the long term equilibium values faster 
when they start below or above that or whether the speed adjustment depend on 
macroeconomic or financial conditions.   
Finally, the model illustrated in the paper has also something to say about whether cycles 
exists or not and ther length can be measured. Most of the evidence in favor or against 
fixed length cycles is based on reduced form equations for the loss ratio. The modelling 
approach outlined in this paper innovates on the subject by investigating separately the 
determinants of the loss ratio and shows that a cyclical pattern emerges as a reaction of 
the system to external shock,  and the speed of adjustment to the equiibrium plays a key 
role. This weakens the case for regular underwiting cycles.  
7. CONCLUSION 
This paper presents a framework for the modelling of premium and profitability dynamics in 
motor insurance. It builds on the existing applied literature on the underwriting cycle and 
introducing an explicit modelling of claims frequency and average costs. The resulting 
simultaneous equation model, applied to the Italian MTPL line of business, is shown to 
provide more accurate forecasts for premium growth and the loss rate with respect to 
standard single equation specifications.  
The methodology could be extended fruitfully by applying panel cointegration techniques. 
The influence of the business cycle on the technical account could be analyzed at different 
levels for example: 
- Using data on companies it is in principle possible to assess the speed at which 
individual entities respond to shocks and to spot common patterns in pricing not 
necessarily justified by the evolution of claims.  
- With data at the local level, to assess the extent of within country mutualization 
- A breakdown by line of business could inform about cross sector subsidizing. 
This is left for future research.  
                                               
48
 See Fredj et al. (2009) for evidence of non-linearity between non-life premiums and GDP based on a 
cointegration framework 
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APPENDIX A: UNIT ROOT TESTS 
 
Without breaks 
Levels Constant Constant & Trend 
 p-value* p-value* 
Frequency 0.7366 0.0561 
Real Average Cost 0.6026 0.4682 
Real Unit Premiums 0.4719 0.9989 
 
1st Difference Constant Constant & Trend 
 p-value* p-value* 
Frequency 0.0057 0.0290 
Real Average Cost 0.0997 0.2023 
Real Unit Premiums 0.1167 0.0713 
 
With Breakpoint 
Level Constant Constant & Trend 
 p-value* Break Date p-value* Break Date 
Frequency 0.7591 2000 0.0407 1992 
Real Average Cost 0.0769 1990 0.8908 1999 
Real Unit Premiums 0.0630 2009 >.99 1998 
*Vogelsang (1993) asymptotic one-sided p-values. 
 
 
 
 
1st Difference Constant Constant & Trend 
 p-value* Break Date p-value* Break Date 
Frequency 0.106 1993 0.3083 1993 
Real Average Cost 0.2663 2004 0.1077 1997 
Real Unit Premiums <0.01 2004 0.0259 1999 
*Vogelsang (1993) asymptotic one-sided p-values. 
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APPENDIX B: ALTERNATIVE COINTEGRATION TEST (DOLS) 
Frequency 
Dependent Variable: FR_RCA   
Method: Dynamic Least Squares (DOLS)  
Sample (adjusted): 1980 2014  
Included observations: 35 after adjustments 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     Real fuel prices (log) -0.021 0.013 -1.600 0.122 
Real GDP (log) 0.099 0.021 4.707 0.000 
Constant -1.218 0.299 -4.063 0.001 
Linear Trend -0.001 0.000 -2.278 0.032 
Driving license reforms -0.028 0.004 -6.902 0.000 
Traffic code reforms -0.020 0.003 -6.020 0.000 
     
  PhillP   P-values Engle-Granger     hillips-Ouliaris 
    0.303 
    0.272 
Tau-statistic 0.980 
z-statistic 0.383 
     
      
Average claims cost 
Dependent Variable: log(AC/CPI)   
Method: Dynamic Least Squares (DOLS)  
Sample (adjusted): 1980 2014  
Included observations: 35 after adjustments 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     Real wages (log) 1.465 0.411 3.561 0.001 
% of <4 year old cars 0.036 0.013 2.718 0.101 
Constant -0.739 1.152 -0.641 0.526 
Linear Trend 0.049 0.014 3.529 0.001 
     
  Phillp   P-values Engle-Granger     illips-Ouliaris 
    0.868 
    0.844 
Tau-statistic 0.706 
z-statistic 0.444 
     
      
Average premium 
Dependent Variable: log(RPR/STOCK)   
Method: Dynamic Least Squares (DOLS)  
Sample (adjusted): 1980 2014  
Included observations: 35 after adjustments 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     T-Bill Rate -0.016 0.009 -1.709 0.100 
Average claim 0.837 0.079 10.595 0.000 
Constant -0.083 0.071 -1.174 0.252 
MTPL insurance reform -0.069 0.051 -1.334 0.194 
 -0.0157 0.0092 -1.7094 0.0998 
  PhillP   P-values Engle-Granger     hillips-Ouliaris 
    0.511 
    0.443 
Tau-statistic 0.148 
z-statistic 0.153 
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